|
TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS
Monday, 2 February 1998
Page 10
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN-
As we will be continuing in plenary session after the working
groups meet, I should say that the next speakers are Ted Mack,
Gatjil Djerrkura, Richard Court, Rob Borbidge and Tony Rundle.
Mr MACK- The question
of whether Australia is to become a republic is over. Even
monarchists must recognise that, with the vast changes that have
occurred in both England and Australia since Federation, we are
now at a turning point in our history. An independent, democratic
Australia cannot continue with the sovereign of England, her
heirs and successors, and her representative, the
Governor-General, entrenched as the executive government in our
constitution.
The British monarchy
is resident in and represents England. Its succession is based on
unacceptable religious and gender rules and the laws of another
country. But, more fundamentally, the monarchy is based on the
hereditary principle. This principle is incompatible with
democracy where any citizen should be able to aspire to the
highest office in the land. We have moved away from the concept
of subjects loyal to a monarch. In a democracy it is our leaders
who should bear exclusive allegiance to the people.
The people are
sovereign, not the monarch and not the parliament. That is the
definition of a republic and that is what should be entrenched in
our constitution. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that
many Australians have strong emotional ties to the monarchy,
particularly the generation that lived through the Great
Depression and the Second World War and who were born in
Australia before 1949 as British subjects- the generation that
made this country with all its faults a very desirable place to
live, a country which has largely provided a better way of life
for millions of people from less desirable societies in the last
50 years.
In an Australia which
prides itself on tolerance of cultural values and a fair go, the
values of this older generation and their inheritors should not
be trampled, but should be respected. Our inheritance from
England: a relatively stable society, liberal democratic values,
the foundations of our basic institutions, the technical
infrastructure, our education systems, a rich 1,000-year
literature- these are just a few of the legacies.
British
constitutional ties to Australia are not ending as a result of
war or with recriminations or bitterness. On the contrary,
England has responsibly devolved power to Australia virtually
since 1788. The British government at a zenith of imperial power
in 1901 remarkably approved a constitution which only the
Australian people could change. Now Australia has reached
maturity and Britain has got a new direction in Europe. There
should be none of the mean spiritedness which has characterised
the final departure of Britain from many other of its colonies.
Now that we are
finally emerging to the world as a fully independent democracy,
it would be a generous and mature gesture for a formal farewell
to be held to thank Britain for its legacy to this country. An
appropriate occasion would be to invite the Queen, both for this
purpose and as her final act as head of state, to open the
Olympic Games. We now have the opportunity to begin work on a new
constitution that truly reflects our independence and the values
of the liberal democratic society that we have become, a
constitution which can address many of the problems of our
current political administrative structure. This is the more
important reason why Australia should become a republic.
Throughout history
those who hold power have generally used every available means
and every sophistry imaginable to resist relinquishing that
power. It is no surprise, therefore, that the Prime Minister has
joined with Paul Keating and many other courtiers in the elite in
rejecting both the people's right to vote for the
Governor-General and the need for wider constitutional reform.
They pretend that directly electing the Governor-General would
somehow be detrimental to the public good, but it is only their
own interests which would be threatened. The age-old plea that
giving more people say in government will cause instability and
the cliche `if it ain't broke don't fix it' merely underline
self-interest. At best they show how isolated those in government
have become.
In the real world,
contrary to the Prime Minister's and Keating's plea to protect
our parliamentary democracy, Australians view their governments
and bureaucracies with disillusionment and even contempt. As Bob
Ellicott, a former Attorney-General, stated in 1991:
Political
parties and the institutions they run are becoming increasingly
irrelevant and unresponsive to the need of the country and to the
silent majority of Australians who have long supported them.
He goes on to say
that almost every difficult question needing resolution has
become a seemingly impenetrable barrier.
Education, health,
mining, urban sprawl, airports, rural support, immigration, et
cetera have raised questions which are either too difficult or
too politically charged for our politicians to resolve. Indeed,
Australia is like a great Gulliver tied down by 1,000
Lilliputians. Ravaging business tycoons, takeover merchants,
union leaders, special interests, remote bureaucracies, complex
regulations, indecisive and sometimes inept and even corrupt and
lying politicians and many others have combined in an unwitting
conspiracy to tie down the body and debilitate it.
Ordinary people have
been forced to listen in embarrassed silence while government
ministers obviously attempt to con them that basically everything
is in good shape and that the fault for any deficiency lies
elsewhere. Such a staunch monarchist as Sir David Smith wrote in
1992:
There is
much that is wrong with the way this nation is governed and
administered. Never before have we had so many Royal Commissions,
so many other inquiries into our processes of government and the
public administration. Never before have we had so many public
office holders and other public figures in, or facing the
prospect of, prison. Never before have the electors registered
dissatisfaction with a political process by returning so many
independent and minor party candidates to parliament. Never
before has Australia had so many citizens who are hurting because
of what has been done to them by our governments and by their
fellow Australians.
The Clerk of the
House of Representatives J.A. Pettifer said in 1979:
The party
system has overwhelmed the Westminster system and destroyed its
original checks and balances.
That view has been
echoed by the current Clerk of the Senate, Harry Evans, and
virtually every serious observer of the Australian political
scene. International political scientists rate our political
structures as barely democratic. Our level of over-government,
with 842 MPs for 18 million people, is grotesque by world
standards. Even former Prime Minister Bob Hawke said in his 1979
Boyer lectures that our political system was an anachronistic
lunacy which all political parties had a vested interest in
preserving.
There is almost
universal distrust in government and its bureaucracies. Without
trust, government is ineffective even when it is trying genuinely
to act in the public good. It is not just a case of a few bad
apples. The truth is that the constitution vehicle is at the
heart of many of these problems. It is a 19th century model.
Changing the royal insignia on the grille to a locally made one
will not make it roadworthy. A new constitution is required- one
that contains not only a reform framework for the government
administration of this country but also an embodiment of
community values.
However, those who
think that a constitution is a place to impose minority views on
the community or to indulge in social engineering are doomed to
failure. Likewise, those with fantasies of a unitary centralised
state are also doomed. There are national, regional and local
issues and each must be represented. People everywhere now
believe in the ethic of participation and the right to have a
direct say in all issues that affect them. We must tailor our
system of government towards that goal. The functions of
government need to be decentralised to the lowest appropriate
level.
The Australian
Constitution tried to maintain the doctrine of separation of
powers, with the checks and balances fundamental to a democracy-
the executive government, the legislature and the judiciary. It
was compromised at the start by the grafting on of the monarchy
and later almost totally destroyed by the growth of the party
system.
The separation of
powers can be restored, and the accountability of the three arms
improved by the people directly electing the Governor-General as
both head of state and head of government. Powers which largely
remain are set out in the Constitution, but the requirement of
ministers being members of parliament are omitted. Governments
would then be directly responsible to the people and not to
political parties, governments where members were free to think
in terms of public good and not partisan advantage- something
which is now almost impossible. The House of Representatives
could then pursue its fundamental roles of legislating and being
a check on executive government. Cabinet appointments would be
open to a wide array of talent from the private world, federal
and state bureaucracies, universities and even state governments.
Our current system
has a limited talent pool for ministerial appointment, with all
respect to those present. The ability to become a minister has
nothing to do with the ability to be a minister. Ministers are
largely incapable of running a large department, hence the
triumph of Sir Humphrey. They cannot even fulfil their duties as
parliamentarians, let alone those of a local member. This full
separation of powers would go a long way to removing the
corrosive personal ambition from members of parliament, which
takes up a high percentage of all political activity and which
corrupts our public decision making. Witness such political
history as the McMahon-Gorton, Fraser-Snedden, Peacock-Howard or
Calwell-Whitlam, Hayden-Hawke, Hawke-Keating struggles. That
infighting is replicated in the myriad of similar intrigues for
ministerial and shadow ministerial positions.
Direct election of
governments with fixed terms of office is hardly a radical
proposal. It follows the best feature of the American
constitution, which has given that country stability through a
civil war, assassinations and crooked presidents for over 200
years. It has not prevented a nation of four million people from
becoming the dominant power of the world, but we should also
learn from the negative features of the American system which
have all but destroyed its democracy- the ever increasing
quantities of money which have given America the best democracy
that money can buy. Limits on campaign spending and elimination
of major private donations, which are nothing more than bribery,
are already threatening this country.
A second major flaw
in the American system as well as the Australian system is the
electoral procedure. A fair electoral system is fundamental to
democracy. Ours limits choice and rarely reflects the will of the
people. It is subject to manipulation by almost every government.
Ironically, Tasmania in 1907 adopted the most democratic system
in the world- the Hare-Clarke system of proportional voting.
This, in my view, should be constitutionally entrenched for all
Australian parliaments. Many other features need to be entrenched
in our Constitution: fixed four-year terms, term limits for all
representatives and minimum sizes for electorates. We need
entrenched independent mechanisms to prevent bipartisan empire
building and runaway perks, lurks and rorts, to prevent political
parties financing themselves from the public purse. With a full
separation of powers and a lower house genuinely representative
with the capacity to be a check on executive government, together
with a further check by giving the states and the public the
right to initiate referenda, then and only then a house of review
is superfluous.
A constitution based
on the above would restore public trust, provide better and more
efficient government, and reduce the number of MPs in the total
Australian scene by well over 450. So that is why it will never
happen. Many other reforms are also needed and should not be
shirked, including reconciliation, the role of the High Court,
the foreign affairs power, fiscal imbalance, new states or
regions and a bill of rights. After decades of demands for
restructuring almost every aspect of Australian society in the
name of globalisation and efficiency, it is irrational to expect
our political administrative structures to remain quarantined.
We cannot put our
heads in the sand by attempting to graft on a local substitute
for the monarchy to a patently obsolete, already hybrid
constitution that has produced an undemocratic, massively
expensive, moribund political administrative structure. It is a
constitution which encourages continuing careerism, cronyism and
corruption, a constitution resulting in an endless balkanised
legal and bureaucratic Commonwealth-state war, where public
policy is constantly distorted and accountability avoided, a
constitution that has permitted the growth of a parasitic,
adversarial political legal elite where truth and fairness are
irrelevant.
This self-serving
system held in public contempt has rendered the community almost
powerless to change it. At this first even partly democratic
Constitutional Convention in a century, we have to take this
opportunity to equip future generations to face a globalised
highly competitive future. The case for a new constitution is
overwhelming. It can be defeated only by timidity, ignorance and
partisan politics.
Mr DJERRKURA- Mr
Chairman, heads of government and fellow delegates, I wish to
acknowledge the Ngunnawal people on whose traditional land this
important meeting is being held. Before I begin I want to say
some words to you in my own language:
Mangu-watjin ngaya
gathura nhumalingu. Ngalma dhangu ngarru nhama rom malany banghna
dharrpal ngalmalingu.
Ngalma ngarru wangany
manapi bukmak bitjuwanginy Australians. Rrambangi ngalma ngarru
djama bukmaku.
Nhuma ngarra nhama
nganapiliny yolngu bitjuwanginy rrambangi Australians ga
nganapilingu rom malany.
[Translation:
Welcome. This is a very important time for all Australians. Here
in this place, decisions will be made which will shape the future
of our country for many years to come. We must try to make the
right decisions. I ask you to think about the place indigenous
Australians have in our past and in our future. Now is the time
to right the wrongs of the past.]
It is ATSIC's view
that Australia should now, with pride, recognise and acknowledge
the cultural diversity of its people. We are a very different
country today than we were when the Australian Constitution was
drawn up. Yes, in many respects it has served the nation well.
That is not to suggest that it is, or was, flawless.
When it was first
drawn up, the Constitution did not even represent all
Australians. It was discriminatory. For example, indigenous
people were mentioned in the Constitution only in terms of what
we could not expect. Section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution gave
the Commonwealth the power to make laws for any race except
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. Section 127 said
that indigenous people were not to be counted as part of the
Australian population.
The total effect was
to make Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders almost invisible
in terms of the laws of the country. Nevertheless, 30 years ago
the wisdom of the Australian people prevailed when over 90 per
cent of voters in the 1967 referendum supported the removal of
those negative references from our national Constitution. As a
result, the Commonwealth now has the power to take a leading role
in indigenous affairs, and it has increasingly picked up this
responsibility over the past 30 years.
The Commonwealth
government's leadership role remains vital. Despite the positive
changes 30 years ago, there is still some unfinished business. We
have been given this opportunity to say what our Constitution
should contain. In terms of existing provisions, section 25, for
example, is surely a spent provision in modern Australia as,
indeed, is the reference to `A subject of the Queen' in section
117.
The Australian
Constitution should now refer to us as citizens and, therefore,
define our rights and responsibilities as citizens. Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people would certainly like to see
changes to the Constitution that affirm our rights as citizens.
We believe that, while the Constitution once helped to conceal
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people from view, it should
now confirm our existence.
The ATSIC Board of
Commissioners has adopted a number of broad goals for
constitutional change. These changes should be taken as a
contribution to the shaping of the constitutional vision of
Australia. Firstly, the board supports the adoption of a new
preamble to the Constitution that sets down principles for
representative and responsible government that is inclusive of
all its people. A new preamble should acknowledge the diversity
of its people and recognise the status of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander peoples as the indigenous people of Australia. It
should indicate a respect for the land and indigenous cultural
heritage, and a commitment to justice and equity for all.
We believe that there
is a need for a general Australian bill of rights that
specifically includes the recognition of the rights of indigenous
Australians, as exists in a number of other countries. The ATSIC
board also sees the need for constitutional protection against
adverse discrimination on the grounds of race. The wording of
section 51(xxvi), known as the race power, should now be changed
to make it an affirmative power. This will guard against
detrimental acts by governments. In fact, this should have been
done in 1967.
The board also
supports amendments to the Constitution to create reserved seats
in parliament for indigenous Australians, as found in a number of
other Commonwealth countries. I ask the delegates who hear the
views of indigenous people to take them on board and, most
importantly, to act on them in the spirit of reconciliation.
Chairman and
delegates, I have outlined to you a range of areas for change to
our national Constitution from the perspective of indigenous
Australians. It is not presented as our final position as we
believe the process of the constitutional review needs time,
sustained effort and the support of the Australian people. I urge
all delegates to agree on the course that will provide the
greatest opportunities for the entire Australian community.
In closing, let me
say that ATSIC believes that a republic is inevitable. It will
happen as and when Australian people want it and that is how it
must be. My final proposal is that the first day we become the
Republic of Australia, that day be declared and celebrated as
Australia's national day. Thank you.
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN-
Before I call the Hon. Richard Court, papers are being circulated
now with the details of the working groups. There will be a
further announcement after we have heard from Mr Court, the
Premier of Western Australia.
Mr COURT- Thank you,
Deputy Chairman and delegates for the opportunity to address you
today. Western Australians have always taken a very keen interest
in how our federation is working. Western Australians were
reluctant starters to join the federation in first place. In
fact, we were last state to agree to join. Those tensions
remained and they reached a head in the early 1930s, in 1933,
when there was an overwhelming two-thirds vote for secession. In
the 1990s we are working in a constructive way to strengthen the
federation, and our concerns have been trends towards
centralising more power, including financial powers, in Canberra.
In Western Australia,
we established in 1994 a Western Australian Constitutional
Committee which held well-attended public meetings around the
state. They provided a report to the government on a number of
issues, including the balance of power within the federation and
the effect on Western Australia of a move to a republic, if it
took place. I have available here copies of that particular
report if any delegates are keen to read what they came up with.
Incidentally, after
this Convention we start a series of public constitutional forums
again which will be running around the state for the balance of
this year to cover this subject and a number of other subjects.
That particular report was interesting in that it found that the
main concerns that the people of Western Australia had were not
so much with who was going to be our head of state but the need
to strengthen our federation, which they had seen had been
weakened.
In relation to this
Convention, over the next fortnight I would like to briefly
address some of the issues that I see as important. The first is
the need for the support of all the states if there is to be
change to our Constitution. If there is to be change, I believe
that there must be a strongly supported consensus position in all
of the states and agreed to by all of the states. It is being
presumed by some that a majority of votes in a majority of states
will enable change to occur. I believe that should not be the
case.
As a matter of
principle, I believe that all states must agree to a change. That
means that as a group we must work together to bring all states
on side with that consensus position. Whether that means a
separate referendum being held in each state and then a
referendum at the federal level or not, some states will have to
have a referendum to change their own systems under their current
constitutions. I believe that, if one state did not agree and was
forced into acceptance of a change, it would severely weaken our
nation, and there would be ongoing resentment that would be to
the detriment of our nation. Certainly, I know from Western
Australia's perspective that Western Australians will be
suspicious of any change that denies them an equal voice in the
federation.
In relation to the
position and the role of state governors, I believe that the
future of state governors and their roles as constitutional
arbiters, their status and their method of appointment are
entirely the responsibility of the parliaments of the states and
the electors of these parliaments. This Convention must ensure,
therefore, that state governors or heads of state at state and
territory level are not somehow made subordinate in their
appointment and functions to a new Commonwealth head of state.
In relation to the
titles that are being used, the term `president' is one that we
have heard a lot of today. Again, I strongly believe that we
should stay with the current titles that we use, that is, of
Governor-General and governor. The terminology of `president' is
not something that we are familiar with in this country. We do
not use it in the corporate world and people accept that the
position of Governor-General and governor are roles and they know
what those roles are in the community. I do not see any need for
that to change.
I did just briefly
mention the need for strong support of all of the states. History
shows that, for example, since 1960 the only four referendums to
be carried out of 18 had the support of all states and the votes
were something like 91 per cent, 73 per cent, 78 per cent and 80
per cent. I think that is the challenge of this particular
Convention. If there is to be a model for change agreed to, it
has to be one that is going to win that overwhelming strong
support.
That aside, there are
two very basic questions that must be decided. They are: the
powers of a republican head of state, if we are to go down that
path, and the method of appointment, and the two are closely
linked. It does not, for example, make much sense to have
Australians elect a head of state and then discover that this
person has a purely ceremonial role because the current powers of
the Governor-General have been removed. The head of state must be
neither a player nor a spectator but an umpire, and we must
neither overturn our parliamentary system nor short-change the
people of Australia through a powerless head of state. The same
principle should apply to parliamentary democracy at the state
level.
The last thing I
would want to see is another elected politician- an elected head
of state who would very quickly, I believe, be in competition
with the Prime Minister but answerable to no-one. I do not
believe that is acceptable. Similarly, in relation to codifying
the powers of a head of state, I do not believe that you can
codify powers to cover all of the circumstances that you might
want to try to cover. For that reason, I have been strongly of
the view that the changes that we look at need to be minimal. It
needs to be a system that evolves.
The Western
Australian Constitutional Committee I referred to was firmly of
the view that the full powers of the Governor-General should
devolve upon a republican head of state and that discretionary
powers should not be subject to judicial challenge. I am saying
that if there were to be a change we should basically keep our
current system with the Governor-General operating under the
accepted conventions and we should look for an alternative
mechanism to replace the role of the Queen, similar to the
proposals that have been put forward by Mr McGarvie today.
The issue of a
popularly elected head of state is one that would concern a state
like Western Australia because the numbers would lie in New South
Wales and Victoria. We would not want to just sit back and watch
states like Western Australia not being able to have a proper say
in those particular elections.
I just want to
conclude my comments by saying that we should not lose sight of
the fact that our current system is one that works, and it does
work well, but our system should also evolve. But, when we talk
of change, I think we need to be careful and we need to use the
next two weeks to look at all of the aspects of the different
models being put forward because some that might look appealing
on the surface, when we look into the detail, in practice could
well lead us into some major constitutional issues. Thank you.
Mr BORBIDGE- Mr Deputy
Chairman and fellow delegates, there can be no man or woman
present here today who doubts this country's full, unequivocal
independence. It is a long established fact. It is a
constitutional fact. Even if Federation in 1901 failed to confer
the full measure and quality of independence we enjoy today,
subsequent acts of the British parliament and the several
legislatures of Australia remedied that condition.
It was Robert Menzies
who made the sovereign Queen of Australia. He did that in 1953,
her coronation year. Time passes. People and nations change. This
is recognised and welcomed everywhere. The Australia about to
enter the second century of its magnificent Federation is a
country the founders of Federation would hardly recognise, but we
are not unique in that sweep of change, only in the measure of it
and our responses to it. Where we are unique is in being
Australian, in the world view that we have developed and in our
many relationships in the region and throughout the world. We are
unique in having created our own way of dealing with life and
with events.
It is the monarchical
case in the debate about a republic that the monarchy retains a
rightful place as the symbol at the head of our nation. The
monarchy is no more an anachronism than are many other elements
of our national life. The monarchical cause in Australia is
neither against reform nor to the contrary.
The National Party
carries the flag- and, to be quite sure, it is the Australian
flag- for monarchy. It is party policy. There has been no
referendum. There has been merely a voluntary postal ballot for
the elected portion of the delegates to this Convention. There is
no fait accompli. Neither the new republic nor a crownless
Canberra will automatically materialise from the dust of the next
two weeks of debate and caucusing. What there is, however, is an
immensely difficult and, I believe, eventually unmanageable
dichotomy between what we have been asked to come here to
resolve- a manufactured crisis of conscience- and what in
practice it will be possible to achieve.
We are here to
discuss what sort of republic we should have, what actual
proposal should be put to the Australian people. Some of us are
opposed to the very principle of retreat from distant- and I mean
distant in the sense of it being uninvolved with Australia's
day-to-day governance- constitutional monarchy. Others- count me
in this group too- believe that there are more important things
to do at this time in the story of our nation than argue about
how to replace an eminently workable system with an untried and,
indeed at this stage, unknown alternative. Sovereign power
already resides with the people. What aspects of the republican
platforms up for discussion claim to be capable of improving an
absolute?
There is a further
difficulty presented by this Convention and the perimeters within
which it is to operate. We are a federation, a compact of
constitutional entities with established powers and independent
legislatures. The states are sovereign. It is a stark
demonstration of the ill-conceived nature of much republican
meandering if the constitutional position of the states is left
largely alone except as an embarrassment to those who seek to
centralise political power. The people will be properly wary on
that score. Beware of activists bearing gifts!
Australians have
inherited and developed their own version of British
parliamentary democracy and representative government. Here, as
in Britain, the clear dangers of dualism, of rival political
mandates, have been eliminated by constitutional barriers to
monarchical power. The Queen today exercises no power except that
of moral force and constitutional propriety. Reject dualism.
The process of
government we enjoy began with the Magna Carta. Republicans might
want to tell us that this was an incident nearly 800 years ago on
a small island a very long way from here. So it was. But it was
also the seed that eventually grew into the democracy and civil
rights we enjoy today. If history is an accident, as some
post-modernist navel gazers assert by way of argument against
bothering with it, this one was a happy accident. It might be
argued that representative democracy still has not got us very
far in terms of response to popular will. Everything can be
improved. But I would argue strongly against the theory that
Australia is ill served in terms of effective popular power
because of the presence of monarchy.
In fact, the reverse
is true. That this is so is to our distinct and direct advantage.
It might be argued- indeed, it is, to distraction- that Australia
is somehow less than fully independent because our Queen is also
someone else's. But cutting the link to the monarch would not
advance one inch the cause of Australia's continued independence
or recognition of the fact- which, by the way, is generally well
known by everyone around the world who needs to know or cares to.
Making it possible for the Australian head of state, the
Governor-General, to be greeted with a 21-gun salute on arrival
in foreign parts instead of the 19 to which the holder of that
office is today entitled is giving a very high priority indeed to
the symbols of the past. Better perhaps that those who seek
cosmetic change lobby the world to expend less ammunition.
We are asked at this
Convention essentially to choose between three models for a
republican system: the mini, the medi and the maxi. Of these
three models, the minimalist position is the most attractive,
albeit of an ugly bunch. It would do least damage to the system
of government which has served us so well. It would effectively
entrench within the existing parliamentary system the practice by
which a nominee for Governor-General has been recommended to the
Queen. It would broaden it only slightly. It would neither unduly
upset the delicate balance of Australia's federated
constitutional position nor destabilise parliamentary government.
It would retain the symbolic nature of the head of state and
continue the vital separation of that office from the practice of
politics.
The second option is
for a larger but still collegiate selection process for a head of
state. This increases the danger of popular politics entering the
equation. It risks marginalising the parliament and blocking the
executive.
The third option is
popular election of the head of state. Australian democracy is
combative and intrusive. It is highly partisan. All this is good
at the parliamentary level and on the hustings but, in my view,
it would be disastrous and constitutionally dangerous to engage
in a popular election process for a president.
I acknowledge that
this is the system which is reported to have attracted popular
favour. I cannot believe that this preferred position is well
thought out. A vote of all the people for a president would
inevitably and immediately plunge the country into the whirlpool
of rival popular mandates between the President and the Prime
Minister. Forget the promises that a president's powers would be
constitutionally limited and heavily codified under a system of
popular election. A political mandate is a dynamic creature. Its
cause can be promoted by many more people than just the winner of
the election.
What's more, a
president elected by popular vote would in practice mean the
holder of the office would always come from Sydney or Melbourne.
There would almost be no opportunity for an eminent Queenslander-
or, for that matter, Western Australian, South Australian or
Tasmanian- to be elected. Under such a system, Australia would
most likely have been denied the public service of Bill Hayden at
Yarralumla.
I believe that we
should reject popular election. We must keep intact the balances
that have kept Australia stable. In particular- and I make this
point with considerable force- the several and separate positions
of the states cannot be ignored in any model for a republic. It
would be totally unacceptable for non-Queenslanders to dictate
changes to the state constitution. Further, much more in the
Queensland constitution is entrenched than is the case in other
states. Our parliament has delegated to the people the duty of
deciding many constitutional questions. Any attempt to force
change in Queensland on matters relating to these delegations to
the people would be, I submit, a threat to the Federation. These
and other difficulties are substantial.
Sir Harry Gibbs,
former Commonwealth Chief Justice, lit a warning light recently
in his Christmas message to members of the Samuel Griffiths
Society. It is worth repeating here. Sir Harry wrote:
The
proponents of a republic now are facing the difficult questions
that have to be resolved before a republic constitution could be
drawn- particularly, how should a President be appointed or
dismissed, what powers should a President have, and whether these
powers should be codified or justiciable, and what should be the
position of the States.
He goes on:
The
Honourable Richard McGarvie, QC, who recognised more clearly than
most the disadvantages of the selection of a President either by
popular election or by parliamentary choice, would place
appointment and dismissal in the hands of a committee of eminent
retirees.
This
proposal raises further questions, particularly in regard to
dismissal. Is the committee to have a discretion? Must it afford
natural justice to a President faced with dismissal? Must it act
immediately, or within reasonable time, or when it thinks fit?
Can it act
by a majority, and if so is the minority view to be made public?
The answers to these questions would have to be made clear in the
Constitution if this proposal were accepted.
He ended his message
by noting that 1998 should be an interesting year. The power of
judicial understatement has always been tremendous.
This Constitutional
Convention has a difficult task. We shall follow its proceedings
with close attention. Our delegates will have more to say during
those proceedings, but the bottom line surely is this: it is the
Convention's job to come up with something that works better than
the present system, that is safer for the welfare and democratic
health of the nation, that is more protective of these things and
that more completely serves the people of Australia, a proposal
that represents an actual advance on all of these fronts instead
of just another out of body experience. If it does this, then we
can debate the substantive question.
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN-
Before I call Tony Rundle- and I hope you won't be embarrassed if
you lose some of your audience- those delegates who have
nominated themselves for working groups should now adjourn to
Kings Hall to assemble with the committee's designated convenor
and a member of the Convention staff will guide them to the
designated meeting room. The membership of the working groups is
as follows:
Meeting in
Committee Room 2
1. Same range of
powers with the existing constraints on their use; no express
provision to be made about the conventions that guide the use of
the reserve powers.
Greg Craven*
Annette Knight
Richard McGarvie
Michael Kilgariff
Liam Bartlett
Peter Sams
Clare Thomson
*convenor
Meeting in
Committee Room 7
2. Same range of
powers with an express provision to incorporate by reference the
conventions governing the use of the reserve powers.
Eric Lockett
Sue West
Julie Bishop*
Christine Milne
Jocelyn Newman
Mary Imlach
Paul Tully
Linda Kirk
*convenor
Meeting in
Committee Room 8
3. Same powers with a
written statement of the conventions governing the use of the
reserve powers as a non-binding guide.
Mia Handshin
Dannalee Bell
Catherine Moore
Mary Delahunty*
Kate Lundy
*convenor
Meeting in
Committee Room 6
4. Same powers with
codification of the conventions governing the use of the reserve
powers as binding rules.
Gareth Evans
Steve Vizard
Misha Schubert
Nick Bolkus
Glenda Hewitt
Carl Moller
George Pell
Mike Elliott
Tim Costello
Peter Beattie
Geoff Gallop
Judith Sloan
George Winterton*
Stella Axarlis
Baden Teague
Kirstin Andrews
Anne Witheford
Neville Wran
Malcolm Turnbull
*convenor
Meeting in
Committee Room 5
5. The present powers
of the head of state and the defects of the known republican
alternatives.
Joan Moloney
Moira Rayner
Moira O'Brien
Edward O'Farrell
John Fleming
Reg Withers*
Christine Ferguson
Kym Bonython
John Hepworth
Digger James
Geoff Hourn
Julian Leeser
Doug Sutherland
Lindsay Fox
Sarina Russo
Poppy King
*convenor
Meeting in
Serviced Office Area Conference Room
6. Broader powers for
a new head of state.
Eric Bullmore
Ted Mack*
Patrick O'Brien
Ed Haber
Andrew Gunter
*convenor
Meeting in
Delegates Lounge South
7. Lesser powers of
the head of state with codification.
(*New working group
proposed by Clem Jones, on 2 February 1998)
Clem Jones
David Muir
Ann Bunnell
Phil Cleary
Gareth Evans
Peter Beattie
Paul Tully
Moria Rayner
Mary Kelly*
Marguerite Scott
Eddie McGuire
Jennie George
Michael Lavarch
Peter Grogan
*convenor
Previous Page
Next Page
·===============  ===============·
Last updated: 21 October 2000
| 
