The Foundation for National Renewal   The Constitutional Convention of February 1998

Federal Election October 2004: Which Candidates Trust the People?

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Monday, 2 February 1998
Page 10

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN- As we will be continuing in plenary session after the working groups meet, I should say that the next speakers are Ted Mack, Gatjil Djerrkura, Richard Court, Rob Borbidge and Tony Rundle.

Mr MACK- The question of whether Australia is to become a republic is over. Even monarchists must recognise that, with the vast changes that have occurred in both England and Australia since Federation, we are now at a turning point in our history. An independent, democratic Australia cannot continue with the sovereign of England, her heirs and successors, and her representative, the Governor-General, entrenched as the executive government in our constitution.

The British monarchy is resident in and represents England. Its succession is based on unacceptable religious and gender rules and the laws of another country. But, more fundamentally, the monarchy is based on the hereditary principle. This principle is incompatible with democracy where any citizen should be able to aspire to the highest office in the land. We have moved away from the concept of subjects loyal to a monarch. In a democracy it is our leaders who should bear exclusive allegiance to the people.

The people are sovereign, not the monarch and not the parliament. That is the definition of a republic and that is what should be entrenched in our constitution. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that many Australians have strong emotional ties to the monarchy, particularly the generation that lived through the Great Depression and the Second World War and who were born in Australia before 1949 as British subjects- the generation that made this country with all its faults a very desirable place to live, a country which has largely provided a better way of life for millions of people from less desirable societies in the last 50 years.

In an Australia which prides itself on tolerance of cultural values and a fair go, the values of this older generation and their inheritors should not be trampled, but should be respected. Our inheritance from England: a relatively stable society, liberal democratic values, the foundations of our basic institutions, the technical infrastructure, our education systems, a rich 1,000-year literature- these are just a few of the legacies.

British constitutional ties to Australia are not ending as a result of war or with recriminations or bitterness. On the contrary, England has responsibly devolved power to Australia virtually since 1788. The British government at a zenith of imperial power in 1901 remarkably approved a constitution which only the Australian people could change. Now Australia has reached maturity and Britain has got a new direction in Europe. There should be none of the mean spiritedness which has characterised the final departure of Britain from many other of its colonies.

Now that we are finally emerging to the world as a fully independent democracy, it would be a generous and mature gesture for a formal farewell to be held to thank Britain for its legacy to this country. An appropriate occasion would be to invite the Queen, both for this purpose and as her final act as head of state, to open the Olympic Games. We now have the opportunity to begin work on a new constitution that truly reflects our independence and the values of the liberal democratic society that we have become, a constitution which can address many of the problems of our current political administrative structure. This is the more important reason why Australia should become a republic.

Throughout history those who hold power have generally used every available means and every sophistry imaginable to resist relinquishing that power. It is no surprise, therefore, that the Prime Minister has joined with Paul Keating and many other courtiers in the elite in rejecting both the people's right to vote for the Governor-General and the need for wider constitutional reform. They pretend that directly electing the Governor-General would somehow be detrimental to the public good, but it is only their own interests which would be threatened. The age-old plea that giving more people say in government will cause instability and the cliche `if it ain't broke don't fix it' merely underline self-interest. At best they show how isolated those in government have become.

In the real world, contrary to the Prime Minister's and Keating's plea to protect our parliamentary democracy, Australians view their governments and bureaucracies with disillusionment and even contempt. As Bob Ellicott, a former Attorney-General, stated in 1991:

Political parties and the institutions they run are becoming increasingly irrelevant and unresponsive to the need of the country and to the silent majority of Australians who have long supported them.

He goes on to say that almost every difficult question needing resolution has become a seemingly impenetrable barrier.

Education, health, mining, urban sprawl, airports, rural support, immigration, et cetera have raised questions which are either too difficult or too politically charged for our politicians to resolve. Indeed, Australia is like a great Gulliver tied down by 1,000 Lilliputians. Ravaging business tycoons, takeover merchants, union leaders, special interests, remote bureaucracies, complex regulations, indecisive and sometimes inept and even corrupt and lying politicians and many others have combined in an unwitting conspiracy to tie down the body and debilitate it.

Ordinary people have been forced to listen in embarrassed silence while government ministers obviously attempt to con them that basically everything is in good shape and that the fault for any deficiency lies elsewhere. Such a staunch monarchist as Sir David Smith wrote in 1992:

There is much that is wrong with the way this nation is governed and administered. Never before have we had so many Royal Commissions, so many other inquiries into our processes of government and the public administration. Never before have we had so many public office holders and other public figures in, or facing the prospect of, prison. Never before have the electors registered dissatisfaction with a political process by returning so many independent and minor party candidates to parliament. Never before has Australia had so many citizens who are hurting because of what has been done to them by our governments and by their fellow Australians.

The Clerk of the House of Representatives J.A. Pettifer said in 1979:

The party system has overwhelmed the Westminster system and destroyed its original checks and balances.

That view has been echoed by the current Clerk of the Senate, Harry Evans, and virtually every serious observer of the Australian political scene. International political scientists rate our political structures as barely democratic. Our level of over-government, with 842 MPs for 18 million people, is grotesque by world standards. Even former Prime Minister Bob Hawke said in his 1979 Boyer lectures that our political system was an anachronistic lunacy which all political parties had a vested interest in preserving.

There is almost universal distrust in government and its bureaucracies. Without trust, government is ineffective even when it is trying genuinely to act in the public good. It is not just a case of a few bad apples. The truth is that the constitution vehicle is at the heart of many of these problems. It is a 19th century model. Changing the royal insignia on the grille to a locally made one will not make it roadworthy. A new constitution is required- one that contains not only a reform framework for the government administration of this country but also an embodiment of community values.

However, those who think that a constitution is a place to impose minority views on the community or to indulge in social engineering are doomed to failure. Likewise, those with fantasies of a unitary centralised state are also doomed. There are national, regional and local issues and each must be represented. People everywhere now believe in the ethic of participation and the right to have a direct say in all issues that affect them. We must tailor our system of government towards that goal. The functions of government need to be decentralised to the lowest appropriate level.

The Australian Constitution tried to maintain the doctrine of separation of powers, with the checks and balances fundamental to a democracy- the executive government, the legislature and the judiciary. It was compromised at the start by the grafting on of the monarchy and later almost totally destroyed by the growth of the party system.

The separation of powers can be restored, and the accountability of the three arms improved by the people directly electing the Governor-General as both head of state and head of government. Powers which largely remain are set out in the Constitution, but the requirement of ministers being members of parliament are omitted. Governments would then be directly responsible to the people and not to political parties, governments where members were free to think in terms of public good and not partisan advantage- something which is now almost impossible. The House of Representatives could then pursue its fundamental roles of legislating and being a check on executive government. Cabinet appointments would be open to a wide array of talent from the private world, federal and state bureaucracies, universities and even state governments.

Our current system has a limited talent pool for ministerial appointment, with all respect to those present. The ability to become a minister has nothing to do with the ability to be a minister. Ministers are largely incapable of running a large department, hence the triumph of Sir Humphrey. They cannot even fulfil their duties as parliamentarians, let alone those of a local member. This full separation of powers would go a long way to removing the corrosive personal ambition from members of parliament, which takes up a high percentage of all political activity and which corrupts our public decision making. Witness such political history as the McMahon-Gorton, Fraser-Snedden, Peacock-Howard or Calwell-Whitlam, Hayden-Hawke, Hawke-Keating struggles. That infighting is replicated in the myriad of similar intrigues for ministerial and shadow ministerial positions.

Direct election of governments with fixed terms of office is hardly a radical proposal. It follows the best feature of the American constitution, which has given that country stability through a civil war, assassinations and crooked presidents for over 200 years. It has not prevented a nation of four million people from becoming the dominant power of the world, but we should also learn from the negative features of the American system which have all but destroyed its democracy- the ever increasing quantities of money which have given America the best democracy that money can buy. Limits on campaign spending and elimination of major private donations, which are nothing more than bribery, are already threatening this country.

A second major flaw in the American system as well as the Australian system is the electoral procedure. A fair electoral system is fundamental to democracy. Ours limits choice and rarely reflects the will of the people. It is subject to manipulation by almost every government. Ironically, Tasmania in 1907 adopted the most democratic system in the world- the Hare-Clarke system of proportional voting. This, in my view, should be constitutionally entrenched for all Australian parliaments. Many other features need to be entrenched in our Constitution: fixed four-year terms, term limits for all representatives and minimum sizes for electorates. We need entrenched independent mechanisms to prevent bipartisan empire building and runaway perks, lurks and rorts, to prevent political parties financing themselves from the public purse. With a full separation of powers and a lower house genuinely representative with the capacity to be a check on executive government, together with a further check by giving the states and the public the right to initiate referenda, then and only then a house of review is superfluous.

A constitution based on the above would restore public trust, provide better and more efficient government, and reduce the number of MPs in the total Australian scene by well over 450. So that is why it will never happen. Many other reforms are also needed and should not be shirked, including reconciliation, the role of the High Court, the foreign affairs power, fiscal imbalance, new states or regions and a bill of rights. After decades of demands for restructuring almost every aspect of Australian society in the name of globalisation and efficiency, it is irrational to expect our political administrative structures to remain quarantined.

We cannot put our heads in the sand by attempting to graft on a local substitute for the monarchy to a patently obsolete, already hybrid constitution that has produced an undemocratic, massively expensive, moribund political administrative structure. It is a constitution which encourages continuing careerism, cronyism and corruption, a constitution resulting in an endless balkanised legal and bureaucratic Commonwealth-state war, where public policy is constantly distorted and accountability avoided, a constitution that has permitted the growth of a parasitic, adversarial political legal elite where truth and fairness are irrelevant.

This self-serving system held in public contempt has rendered the community almost powerless to change it. At this first even partly democratic Constitutional Convention in a century, we have to take this opportunity to equip future generations to face a globalised highly competitive future. The case for a new constitution is overwhelming. It can be defeated only by timidity, ignorance and partisan politics.

Mr DJERRKURA- Mr Chairman, heads of government and fellow delegates, I wish to acknowledge the Ngunnawal people on whose traditional land this important meeting is being held. Before I begin I want to say some words to you in my own language:

Mangu-watjin ngaya gathura nhumalingu. Ngalma dhangu ngarru nhama rom malany banghna dharrpal ngalmalingu.

Ngalma ngarru wangany manapi bukmak bitjuwanginy Australians. Rrambangi ngalma ngarru djama bukmaku.

Nhuma ngarra nhama nganapiliny yolngu bitjuwanginy rrambangi Australians ga nganapilingu rom malany.

[Translation: Welcome. This is a very important time for all Australians. Here in this place, decisions will be made which will shape the future of our country for many years to come. We must try to make the right decisions. I ask you to think about the place indigenous Australians have in our past and in our future. Now is the time to right the wrongs of the past.]

It is ATSIC's view that Australia should now, with pride, recognise and acknowledge the cultural diversity of its people. We are a very different country today than we were when the Australian Constitution was drawn up. Yes, in many respects it has served the nation well. That is not to suggest that it is, or was, flawless.

When it was first drawn up, the Constitution did not even represent all Australians. It was discriminatory. For example, indigenous people were mentioned in the Constitution only in terms of what we could not expect. Section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution gave the Commonwealth the power to make laws for any race except Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. Section 127 said that indigenous people were not to be counted as part of the Australian population.

The total effect was to make Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders almost invisible in terms of the laws of the country. Nevertheless, 30 years ago the wisdom of the Australian people prevailed when over 90 per cent of voters in the 1967 referendum supported the removal of those negative references from our national Constitution. As a result, the Commonwealth now has the power to take a leading role in indigenous affairs, and it has increasingly picked up this responsibility over the past 30 years.

The Commonwealth government's leadership role remains vital. Despite the positive changes 30 years ago, there is still some unfinished business. We have been given this opportunity to say what our Constitution should contain. In terms of existing provisions, section 25, for example, is surely a spent provision in modern Australia as, indeed, is the reference to `A subject of the Queen' in section 117.

The Australian Constitution should now refer to us as citizens and, therefore, define our rights and responsibilities as citizens. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people would certainly like to see changes to the Constitution that affirm our rights as citizens. We believe that, while the Constitution once helped to conceal Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people from view, it should now confirm our existence.

The ATSIC Board of Commissioners has adopted a number of broad goals for constitutional change. These changes should be taken as a contribution to the shaping of the constitutional vision of Australia. Firstly, the board supports the adoption of a new preamble to the Constitution that sets down principles for representative and responsible government that is inclusive of all its people. A new preamble should acknowledge the diversity of its people and recognise the status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as the indigenous people of Australia. It should indicate a respect for the land and indigenous cultural heritage, and a commitment to justice and equity for all.

We believe that there is a need for a general Australian bill of rights that specifically includes the recognition of the rights of indigenous Australians, as exists in a number of other countries. The ATSIC board also sees the need for constitutional protection against adverse discrimination on the grounds of race. The wording of section 51(xxvi), known as the race power, should now be changed to make it an affirmative power. This will guard against detrimental acts by governments. In fact, this should have been done in 1967.

The board also supports amendments to the Constitution to create reserved seats in parliament for indigenous Australians, as found in a number of other Commonwealth countries. I ask the delegates who hear the views of indigenous people to take them on board and, most importantly, to act on them in the spirit of reconciliation.

Chairman and delegates, I have outlined to you a range of areas for change to our national Constitution from the perspective of indigenous Australians. It is not presented as our final position as we believe the process of the constitutional review needs time, sustained effort and the support of the Australian people. I urge all delegates to agree on the course that will provide the greatest opportunities for the entire Australian community.

In closing, let me say that ATSIC believes that a republic is inevitable. It will happen as and when Australian people want it and that is how it must be. My final proposal is that the first day we become the Republic of Australia, that day be declared and celebrated as Australia's national day. Thank you.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN- Before I call the Hon. Richard Court, papers are being circulated now with the details of the working groups. There will be a further announcement after we have heard from Mr Court, the Premier of Western Australia.

Mr COURT- Thank you, Deputy Chairman and delegates for the opportunity to address you today. Western Australians have always taken a very keen interest in how our federation is working. Western Australians were reluctant starters to join the federation in first place. In fact, we were last state to agree to join. Those tensions remained and they reached a head in the early 1930s, in 1933, when there was an overwhelming two-thirds vote for secession. In the 1990s we are working in a constructive way to strengthen the federation, and our concerns have been trends towards centralising more power, including financial powers, in Canberra.

In Western Australia, we established in 1994 a Western Australian Constitutional Committee which held well-attended public meetings around the state. They provided a report to the government on a number of issues, including the balance of power within the federation and the effect on Western Australia of a move to a republic, if it took place. I have available here copies of that particular report if any delegates are keen to read what they came up with.

Incidentally, after this Convention we start a series of public constitutional forums again which will be running around the state for the balance of this year to cover this subject and a number of other subjects. That particular report was interesting in that it found that the main concerns that the people of Western Australia had were not so much with who was going to be our head of state but the need to strengthen our federation, which they had seen had been weakened.

In relation to this Convention, over the next fortnight I would like to briefly address some of the issues that I see as important. The first is the need for the support of all the states if there is to be change to our Constitution. If there is to be change, I believe that there must be a strongly supported consensus position in all of the states and agreed to by all of the states. It is being presumed by some that a majority of votes in a majority of states will enable change to occur. I believe that should not be the case.

As a matter of principle, I believe that all states must agree to a change. That means that as a group we must work together to bring all states on side with that consensus position. Whether that means a separate referendum being held in each state and then a referendum at the federal level or not, some states will have to have a referendum to change their own systems under their current constitutions. I believe that, if one state did not agree and was forced into acceptance of a change, it would severely weaken our nation, and there would be ongoing resentment that would be to the detriment of our nation. Certainly, I know from Western Australia's perspective that Western Australians will be suspicious of any change that denies them an equal voice in the federation.

In relation to the position and the role of state governors, I believe that the future of state governors and their roles as constitutional arbiters, their status and their method of appointment are entirely the responsibility of the parliaments of the states and the electors of these parliaments. This Convention must ensure, therefore, that state governors or heads of state at state and territory level are not somehow made subordinate in their appointment and functions to a new Commonwealth head of state.

In relation to the titles that are being used, the term `president' is one that we have heard a lot of today. Again, I strongly believe that we should stay with the current titles that we use, that is, of Governor-General and governor. The terminology of `president' is not something that we are familiar with in this country. We do not use it in the corporate world and people accept that the position of Governor-General and governor are roles and they know what those roles are in the community. I do not see any need for that to change.

I did just briefly mention the need for strong support of all of the states. History shows that, for example, since 1960 the only four referendums to be carried out of 18 had the support of all states and the votes were something like 91 per cent, 73 per cent, 78 per cent and 80 per cent. I think that is the challenge of this particular Convention. If there is to be a model for change agreed to, it has to be one that is going to win that overwhelming strong support.

That aside, there are two very basic questions that must be decided. They are: the powers of a republican head of state, if we are to go down that path, and the method of appointment, and the two are closely linked. It does not, for example, make much sense to have Australians elect a head of state and then discover that this person has a purely ceremonial role because the current powers of the Governor-General have been removed. The head of state must be neither a player nor a spectator but an umpire, and we must neither overturn our parliamentary system nor short-change the people of Australia through a powerless head of state. The same principle should apply to parliamentary democracy at the state level.

The last thing I would want to see is another elected politician- an elected head of state who would very quickly, I believe, be in competition with the Prime Minister but answerable to no-one. I do not believe that is acceptable. Similarly, in relation to codifying the powers of a head of state, I do not believe that you can codify powers to cover all of the circumstances that you might want to try to cover. For that reason, I have been strongly of the view that the changes that we look at need to be minimal. It needs to be a system that evolves.

The Western Australian Constitutional Committee I referred to was firmly of the view that the full powers of the Governor-General should devolve upon a republican head of state and that discretionary powers should not be subject to judicial challenge. I am saying that if there were to be a change we should basically keep our current system with the Governor-General operating under the accepted conventions and we should look for an alternative mechanism to replace the role of the Queen, similar to the proposals that have been put forward by Mr McGarvie today.

The issue of a popularly elected head of state is one that would concern a state like Western Australia because the numbers would lie in New South Wales and Victoria. We would not want to just sit back and watch states like Western Australia not being able to have a proper say in those particular elections.

I just want to conclude my comments by saying that we should not lose sight of the fact that our current system is one that works, and it does work well, but our system should also evolve. But, when we talk of change, I think we need to be careful and we need to use the next two weeks to look at all of the aspects of the different models being put forward because some that might look appealing on the surface, when we look into the detail, in practice could well lead us into some major constitutional issues. Thank you.

Mr BORBIDGE- Mr Deputy Chairman and fellow delegates, there can be no man or woman present here today who doubts this country's full, unequivocal independence. It is a long established fact. It is a constitutional fact. Even if Federation in 1901 failed to confer the full measure and quality of independence we enjoy today, subsequent acts of the British parliament and the several legislatures of Australia remedied that condition.

It was Robert Menzies who made the sovereign Queen of Australia. He did that in 1953, her coronation year. Time passes. People and nations change. This is recognised and welcomed everywhere. The Australia about to enter the second century of its magnificent Federation is a country the founders of Federation would hardly recognise, but we are not unique in that sweep of change, only in the measure of it and our responses to it. Where we are unique is in being Australian, in the world view that we have developed and in our many relationships in the region and throughout the world. We are unique in having created our own way of dealing with life and with events.

It is the monarchical case in the debate about a republic that the monarchy retains a rightful place as the symbol at the head of our nation. The monarchy is no more an anachronism than are many other elements of our national life. The monarchical cause in Australia is neither against reform nor to the contrary.

The National Party carries the flag- and, to be quite sure, it is the Australian flag- for monarchy. It is party policy. There has been no referendum. There has been merely a voluntary postal ballot for the elected portion of the delegates to this Convention. There is no fait accompli. Neither the new republic nor a crownless Canberra will automatically materialise from the dust of the next two weeks of debate and caucusing. What there is, however, is an immensely difficult and, I believe, eventually unmanageable dichotomy between what we have been asked to come here to resolve- a manufactured crisis of conscience- and what in practice it will be possible to achieve.

We are here to discuss what sort of republic we should have, what actual proposal should be put to the Australian people. Some of us are opposed to the very principle of retreat from distant- and I mean distant in the sense of it being uninvolved with Australia's day-to-day governance- constitutional monarchy. Others- count me in this group too- believe that there are more important things to do at this time in the story of our nation than argue about how to replace an eminently workable system with an untried and, indeed at this stage, unknown alternative. Sovereign power already resides with the people. What aspects of the republican platforms up for discussion claim to be capable of improving an absolute?

There is a further difficulty presented by this Convention and the perimeters within which it is to operate. We are a federation, a compact of constitutional entities with established powers and independent legislatures. The states are sovereign. It is a stark demonstration of the ill-conceived nature of much republican meandering if the constitutional position of the states is left largely alone except as an embarrassment to those who seek to centralise political power. The people will be properly wary on that score. Beware of activists bearing gifts!

Australians have inherited and developed their own version of British parliamentary democracy and representative government. Here, as in Britain, the clear dangers of dualism, of rival political mandates, have been eliminated by constitutional barriers to monarchical power. The Queen today exercises no power except that of moral force and constitutional propriety. Reject dualism.

The process of government we enjoy began with the Magna Carta. Republicans might want to tell us that this was an incident nearly 800 years ago on a small island a very long way from here. So it was. But it was also the seed that eventually grew into the democracy and civil rights we enjoy today. If history is an accident, as some post-modernist navel gazers assert by way of argument against bothering with it, this one was a happy accident. It might be argued that representative democracy still has not got us very far in terms of response to popular will. Everything can be improved. But I would argue strongly against the theory that Australia is ill served in terms of effective popular power because of the presence of monarchy.

In fact, the reverse is true. That this is so is to our distinct and direct advantage. It might be argued- indeed, it is, to distraction- that Australia is somehow less than fully independent because our Queen is also someone else's. But cutting the link to the monarch would not advance one inch the cause of Australia's continued independence or recognition of the fact- which, by the way, is generally well known by everyone around the world who needs to know or cares to. Making it possible for the Australian head of state, the Governor-General, to be greeted with a 21-gun salute on arrival in foreign parts instead of the 19 to which the holder of that office is today entitled is giving a very high priority indeed to the symbols of the past. Better perhaps that those who seek cosmetic change lobby the world to expend less ammunition.

We are asked at this Convention essentially to choose between three models for a republican system: the mini, the medi and the maxi. Of these three models, the minimalist position is the most attractive, albeit of an ugly bunch. It would do least damage to the system of government which has served us so well. It would effectively entrench within the existing parliamentary system the practice by which a nominee for Governor-General has been recommended to the Queen. It would broaden it only slightly. It would neither unduly upset the delicate balance of Australia's federated constitutional position nor destabilise parliamentary government. It would retain the symbolic nature of the head of state and continue the vital separation of that office from the practice of politics.

The second option is for a larger but still collegiate selection process for a head of state. This increases the danger of popular politics entering the equation. It risks marginalising the parliament and blocking the executive.

The third option is popular election of the head of state. Australian democracy is combative and intrusive. It is highly partisan. All this is good at the parliamentary level and on the hustings but, in my view, it would be disastrous and constitutionally dangerous to engage in a popular election process for a president.

I acknowledge that this is the system which is reported to have attracted popular favour. I cannot believe that this preferred position is well thought out. A vote of all the people for a president would inevitably and immediately plunge the country into the whirlpool of rival popular mandates between the President and the Prime Minister. Forget the promises that a president's powers would be constitutionally limited and heavily codified under a system of popular election. A political mandate is a dynamic creature. Its cause can be promoted by many more people than just the winner of the election.

What's more, a president elected by popular vote would in practice mean the holder of the office would always come from Sydney or Melbourne. There would almost be no opportunity for an eminent Queenslander- or, for that matter, Western Australian, South Australian or Tasmanian- to be elected. Under such a system, Australia would most likely have been denied the public service of Bill Hayden at Yarralumla.

I believe that we should reject popular election. We must keep intact the balances that have kept Australia stable. In particular- and I make this point with considerable force- the several and separate positions of the states cannot be ignored in any model for a republic. It would be totally unacceptable for non-Queenslanders to dictate changes to the state constitution. Further, much more in the Queensland constitution is entrenched than is the case in other states. Our parliament has delegated to the people the duty of deciding many constitutional questions. Any attempt to force change in Queensland on matters relating to these delegations to the people would be, I submit, a threat to the Federation. These and other difficulties are substantial.

Sir Harry Gibbs, former Commonwealth Chief Justice, lit a warning light recently in his Christmas message to members of the Samuel Griffiths Society. It is worth repeating here. Sir Harry wrote:

The proponents of a republic now are facing the difficult questions that have to be resolved before a republic constitution could be drawn- particularly, how should a President be appointed or dismissed, what powers should a President have, and whether these powers should be codified or justiciable, and what should be the position of the States.

He goes on:

The Honourable Richard McGarvie, QC, who recognised more clearly than most the disadvantages of the selection of a President either by popular election or by parliamentary choice, would place appointment and dismissal in the hands of a committee of eminent retirees.

This proposal raises further questions, particularly in regard to dismissal. Is the committee to have a discretion? Must it afford natural justice to a President faced with dismissal? Must it act immediately, or within reasonable time, or when it thinks fit?

Can it act by a majority, and if so is the minority view to be made public? The answers to these questions would have to be made clear in the Constitution if this proposal were accepted.

He ended his message by noting that 1998 should be an interesting year. The power of judicial understatement has always been tremendous.

This Constitutional Convention has a difficult task. We shall follow its proceedings with close attention. Our delegates will have more to say during those proceedings, but the bottom line surely is this: it is the Convention's job to come up with something that works better than the present system, that is safer for the welfare and democratic health of the nation, that is more protective of these things and that more completely serves the people of Australia, a proposal that represents an actual advance on all of these fronts instead of just another out of body experience. If it does this, then we can debate the substantive question.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN- Before I call Tony Rundle- and I hope you won't be embarrassed if you lose some of your audience- those delegates who have nominated themselves for working groups should now adjourn to Kings Hall to assemble with the committee's designated convenor and a member of the Convention staff will guide them to the designated meeting room. The membership of the working groups is as follows:

 

Meeting in Committee Room 2

1. Same range of powers with the existing constraints on their use; no express provision to be made about the conventions that guide the use of the reserve powers.

Greg Craven*

Annette Knight

Richard McGarvie

Michael Kilgariff

Liam Bartlett

Peter Sams

Clare Thomson

*convenor

Meeting in Committee Room 7

2. Same range of powers with an express provision to incorporate by reference the conventions governing the use of the reserve powers.

Eric Lockett

Sue West

Julie Bishop*

Christine Milne

Jocelyn Newman

Mary Imlach

Paul Tully

Linda Kirk

*convenor

Meeting in Committee Room 8

3. Same powers with a written statement of the conventions governing the use of the reserve powers as a non-binding guide.

Mia Handshin

Dannalee Bell

Catherine Moore

Mary Delahunty*

Kate Lundy

*convenor

Meeting in Committee Room 6

4. Same powers with codification of the conventions governing the use of the reserve powers as binding rules.

Gareth Evans

Steve Vizard

Misha Schubert

Nick Bolkus

Glenda Hewitt

Carl Moller

George Pell

Mike Elliott

Tim Costello

Peter Beattie

Geoff Gallop

Judith Sloan

George Winterton*

Stella Axarlis

Baden Teague

Kirstin Andrews

Anne Witheford

Neville Wran

Malcolm Turnbull

*convenor

Meeting in Committee Room 5

5. The present powers of the head of state and the defects of the known republican alternatives.

Joan Moloney

Moira Rayner

Moira O'Brien

Edward O'Farrell

John Fleming

Reg Withers*

Christine Ferguson

Kym Bonython

John Hepworth

Digger James

Geoff Hourn

Julian Leeser

Doug Sutherland

Lindsay Fox

Sarina Russo

Poppy King

*convenor

Meeting in Serviced Office Area Conference Room

6. Broader powers for a new head of state.

Eric Bullmore

Ted Mack*

Patrick O'Brien

Ed Haber

Andrew Gunter

*convenor

Meeting in Delegates Lounge South

7. Lesser powers of the head of state with codification.

(*New working group proposed by Clem Jones, on 2 February 1998)

Clem Jones

David Muir

Ann Bunnell

Phil Cleary

Gareth Evans

Peter Beattie

Paul Tully

Moria Rayner

Mary Kelly*

Marguerite Scott

Eddie McGuire

Jennie George

Michael Lavarch

Peter Grogan

*convenor

 
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Last updated: 21 October 2000