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TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS
Wednesday, 4 February 1998
Page 6
CHAIRMAN- I now call
on Mr Malcolm Turnbull to speak on the issue of the day.
Mr TURNBULL- We are now dealing
with the method of election. There has been a bit of controversy
as we all know about the method of directly electing the head of
state. Those who favour direct election for an essentially
powerless head of state, which is the Irish model that is being
discussed here, claim to do so in defence of popular sovereignty.
They have said that indirect election by parliament is an outrage
and a denial of popular sovereignty. But is it not a paradox that
they believe the people's popular sovereignty demands the people
should elect a powerless ceremonial head of state but the head of
government, the Prime Minister, should be indirectly elected by
the House of Representatives?
Mr RUXTON- Point of
order, Mr Chairman-
CHAIRMAN- No need to
interrupt him, Mr Ruxton. Must you do so now?
Mr TURNBULL- Mr Ruxton
is on his feet. I am silent.
CHAIRMAN- What is your
point of order, Mr Ruxton?
Mr RUXTON- My point of
order is: how did Mr Turnbull jump the queue?
CHAIRMAN- Like many
other delegates, he has exchanged his place of speaking with
another delegate.
Mr TURNBULL- Thank
you, Mr Chairman. I trust I will be given a little extra time to
accommodate Mr Ruxton's intervention. The only direct election
model which is intellectually consistent with the proposition
that popular sovereignty demands that the people directly choose
their leaders is one where the chief executive of the nation is
also the head of state, which is the Ted Mack American-style
model.
Far be it from any of us to
criticise, deride or denigrate the American constitution, but it
is preposterous to suggest, however compelling that model may be,
that right now in 1998 there is any prospect of getting broad or
any significant popular support for an American-style
constitution. So I would say to the advocates of direct election
on the Irish model: why is indirect election acceptable for the
Prime Minister, the office holder with all the power, but utterly
unacceptable and an affront for a ceremonial head of state?
I turn to what has been
called the McGarvie model. This is essentially the ultimately
minimal proposal where the Queen is replaced by a Constitutional
Council and essentially the Prime Minister continues to be able
to nominate and remove the head of state at his whim. This model
was suggested to the Republic Advisory Committee by a number of
people, including Richard McGarvie.
This model is a blindingly
obvious minimal development. You take out the Queen and you put
in something else. Indeed, it was suggested to us by a number of
heads of government- Premiers and so forth- a number of
governors, former governors and former governors-general. It is a
perfectly sensible model if you start from the premise of having
absolutely minimal change.
But we asked ourselves in the
ARM when we considered this how we could improve the existing
system. We asked ourselves: what would a Prime Minister do who
was acting in an ideal fashion, who was being the ultimately
reasonable Prime Minister? What he would do is consult with the
Leader of the Opposition and say, `I'm considering these people.
What do you think?' and he would ensure that there was broad
support. Would we not regard it as an improvement in our
constitutional affairs if the Governor-General always had the
support of both sides of parliament?
We accept a process of
consultation already with the appointment of judges. Sometimes
that does not always present somebody who is bipartisan, but
there is a concession of a process of consultation between the
federal and state governments. The ARM model ensures that you
will have as a head of state somebody who has bipartisan support.
That surely is an improvement.
Where the criticism of the
ARM model has, it is fair to say, some merit is in the area of
dismissal, and I think it is fair to say that the bulk of Mr
McGarvie's, Mr Howard's and others' criticism of the ARM model
has been directed at that. The reasoning given is that you get a
head of state who cannot work with the Prime Minister, the
situation is untenable and the Leader of the Opposition is not
going to accommodate the Prime Minister in removing him. It has
never happened in our federal system. It is an extreme
circumstance, but we accept that in a contest between the head of
state and the person who commands the majority of the members of
the people's house the people's house must prevail. At the end of
the day, the House of Representatives must prevail in that
contest.
So we are very open, as I
said in my opening remarks, to different models for removing the
head of state. They could include a decision of the Prime
Minister alone, perhaps formally mediated by a constitutional
council along the lines of the one that Mr McGarvie has been
discussing. We could say that this motion of the Prime Minister's
to remove should have the support of a majority of ministers or a
majority of members of the Executive Council in order to get
around the problem occasioned by circumstances similar to those
that faced Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen when he was Premier of
Queensland and lost the support of his cabinet. He wanted to
advise the Governor to dissolve parliament as a means of escaping
from his own internal party room difficulties. One could say
that, if he had had the power to sack the Governor instanter, he
may well have exercised it. So there is some merit in having a
process, be it a majority of the members of the Executive Council
or a constitutional council of the kind Mr McGarvie has proposed,
which would act as a brake against that rare circumstance.
The model which attracts the
ARM is a simple majority of the House of Representatives. We
believe we should affirm our confidence in and commitment to the
parliamentary system. That would almost inevitably mean the Prime
Minister would have his way, but he or she would have to persuade
their party room and be prepared to stand up in front of the
Australian people and say, `This is what I'm doing,' and allocate
some reasons for doing so.
A concern has been raised
with us by several delegates about what happens if, in between
the Prime Minister recalling parliament to move this motion, the
head of state leaps in and sacks the Prime Minister and appoints
someone else. There is a simple and straightforward solution to
that. It would fit very well into clause 5 of the partial
codification model- which is at page 105 of the RAC report- which
would be to say that, between the notice of recalling parliament
or the notice of motion to remove the head of state and that vote
being taken, the head of state cannot dismiss the Prime Minister
or dissolve parliament. That would mean that, during that interim
period, essentially there is a stand-off, nothing could be done
by either party to the other, and then parliament would make up
its mind.
I now want to deal with the
issue of nomination. We believe that there is considerable scope
in the parliament, presumably through a select committee,
consulting widely with the community as to who would be an
appropriate head of state. In a sense, this happens already
because, as the term of one Governor-General is coming to an end,
there is speculation as to who the next person will be and there
is commentary and so forth. That is perfectly defensible and
important in a democracy, but we believe there is merit in having
a more formal process. Whether that should involve nominations
being made with so many signatures is an interesting concept.
We want to talk with other
delegates about this and work up something that is feasible. I
suspect that a commitment to consult, an obligation to consult,
and an obligation to take into account the submissions of the
public may be more effective than having a process of people
sending in nominations, because there may be some very good and
valuable views which do have broad support but the proponents of
which have not sat in shopping centre for hours. (Extension of
time granted) It would be more effective than having a formal
signature, write-in nomination proposal.
We are very open to a
community based method of consulting to ensure that the interest
of the community in supporting eligible candidates is taken into
account. I am sure that, as a matter of practice, that would
happen now. Governments would take that into account and, under
the two-thirds model, oppositions would also take into account
the suggestions from the public.
Those are my contributions on
the mechanics. I want to conclude with a single observation on
the politics of this. Although not all of you will agree with
this, I believe that all of us have a great interest in the
republic referendum being won. We cannot afford for this
referendum to be lost. It is important that the model that be put
up is one which recognises popular sentiment as far as is
possible, consistent with our constitutional arrangements.
Mr HAYDEN- Consistent
with our belief in our own superior wisdom. That is why you are
excluding the public from the ballot.
Mr TURNBULL- No, Mr
Hayden. You have never had any lack of confidence in your wisdom,
superior or otherwise. There is a strongly held view in the
community that a politician should not fill this job. That is a
view that has been held for a very long time. There was
considerable resentment at the appointment of Mr Hayden. I am not
suggesting that he did not do a good job, but there is real
resentment against the appointment of politicians. That popular
concern can be addressed, can be allayed, by the two-thirds
nomination method. It will ensure that the Bill Deanes or the
Ninian Stephens of this world will be Governor-General, not the
Bill Haydens. History may ultimately decide that that is a loss.
Mr SUTHERLAND- What
about Keating?
Mr TURNBULL- Keating
could never get the support of a two-thirds majority. That is the
whole point. That is why, ultimately, Mr Keating supported the
two-thirds methodology because, plainly, had he supported any
other methodology, people like you would have said that he just
wanted to be president. No former active politician could
conceivably be our head of state under the methodology we have
proposed. That is the single most important political case for
the two-thirds methodology. It improves the method of appointment
because it ensures that an impartial office has bipartisan
support, and it will enhance its prospects of success in the
referendum.
CHAIRMAN- Thank you
very much. There have been a number of other people who have
changed places and, to satisfy the proper inquiry of Mr Ruxton, I
will explain that Mr Tony Cocchiaro is replacing Ms Sallyanne
Atkinson, who will now drop to No. 13 on the list, where Mr
Malcolm Turnbull is listed. Mr Cocchiaro will be followed by Mrs
Christine Milne.
Mr COCCHIARO- Mr Chairman,
delegates, before I outline my position, I will explain my
background, because I think it impacts on what I am going to say.
I am a general family doctor in a working-class area and I am
involved with multicultural groups. Talking of multicultural
groups, when Working Group A presented its paper it included lots
of groups in Australia on the selection panel for the president,
but seemed to have forgotten completely the 30 per cent of
Australians who are of non-English speaking backgrounds. Groups
such as multicultural communities councils and ethnic communities
councils in all the states represent hundreds of organisations.
Altogether, they form the Federation of Ethnic Communities
Council of Australia. Anyway, I am sure that that is something
that could be fixed if that resolution were ever passed.
As I was saying, I believe I
can lay claim to being fairly well in touch with that very large
and usually silent section of the Australian public. In my job as
a GP, I talk to people ranging from the unemployed to the very
well off, other professionals, et cetera, and I get a sense of
what they feel about the future of Australia.
My other advantage, which in
this setting is probably very important, is that I have never
been and am not now a member of any political party. Like 70 per
cent of people, my first reaction when I thought about this
republic and how to choose a president of Australia was to have a
popular election. It is democratic and elections ensure that the
citizens of Australia are the supreme power. That is obvious.
What better way to get one person who embodies what Australia is
than by popular election? But then I thought about it.
These sentiments are fine in
an ideal world. We should always strive for improvement in our
world- and that is why we must have a republic, by the way- but
improvements come slowly, with difficulty, and with painstaking
work, as I am sure Malcolm can tell us, over the last many years.
We are in the real world, and
the real world of politics says that to properly elect a
president would require wholesale changes to our system of
government. We would need to have something like the American
style of presidential system. I contend that, although they are
much better at marketing their system then we are, theirs is not
a better system. I believe our system is better than the American
system. Perhaps we could market it better.
Besides that, even if we
wanted to change to a presidential American style system, how
would it happen? It would be very difficult and would virtually
require a revolution. Therefore, I came to the clear conclusion
that we have to work with the system we have. We are happy with
the system. The other system does not seem to be any better. Once
you come to that conclusion then the system that we have dictates
that the president or the head of state must not have his or her
own large power base. That president must be able to work with
the Prime Minister in a balanced way.
Having arrived at that
conclusion, the options available to us to elect or nominate the
head of state are simple. Election may be attractive but it is
not an option. It cannot be an option in our present system. I
strongly endorse Working Group C's resolution of having
two-thirds of both houses of parliament in a joint sitting
nominating and electing a president with dismissal by the
majority of the House of Representatives.
I noticed that Geoff Gallop
questioned the concept of citizenship of delegates not supporting
direct elections. I believe that nothing could be further from
the truth. It is loud and clear that commonsense balanced with
justice, balanced with democracy, is true citizenship. I am sure
that the monarchists, having heard the republican arguments and
seeing their backs to the wall, will show citizenship and vote
for a republic on the last day.
In summary, the two-thirds
parliamentary majority election with a majority of House of
Representatives dismissal is my clear and first option, and I
urge delegates and the public generally to support this. If, as
appears, Australians do not trust politicians to elect a
president, then we should institute perhaps some other method of
electing the politicians or elect other politicians. We already
have too many elections, too many politicians. Why would you want
another election?
Senator BOSWELL- And
another politician.
Mr COCCHIARO- I am
getting to that. Exactly. Especially when the president is in a
non-executive position. Surely he or she can dismiss the Prime
Minister. Surely he could embody the soul and express the feeling
of the country. He could carry out ceremonies. But the president
cannot raise or lower taxes. They are the important things. So
why have more elections? There appears to be only one valid
reason. It sounds very democratic, but the crunch is that an
elected president is unlikely to be partial and democratic- as
you have said, sir- and we will get a better, more cunning
politician than the other politicians. That is all we will get if
we elect a president.
Therefore, I appeal to fellow
Australians and to delegates to think about what I have said. We
need and must have a republic. We need to go forward. Our system
of government works reasonably well. Let us have some control on
the president via our elected politicians, so we do have control,
and the public, the citizens of Australia, do have control over
the president because we have control of our politicians. That is
ample, in my opinion, and the group C resolution should be the
one adopted.
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