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TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS
Wednesday, 4 February 1998
Page 8
Mr COWAN- Before providing
answers to the question before the chair, there are some quite
fundamental issues which must be addressed by this Convention.
The Constitution and the Commonwealth were created by the states
arising from the conventions and the state referenda of the
1890s. The position of the states should not be ignored in
attempts to shape a model for a republic. With a change to the
head of state we will still have a federation, we will still have
the states and we will still have one indissoluble federal
Commonwealth. So the states cannot be ignored, nor can the people
of any state, nor can the position of state governors who are the
umpires of vital parts of our federation.
The states joined as equal
partners in creating the Constitution and the Commonwealth. I
would not support a situation where that Constitution divides or
downgrades the equal status of the states. We should be sure that
the consensus that was achieved in creating the Australian
Constitution is achieved again, if such a fundamental change that
Australia becomes a republic is to be put to the people. As a
matter of principle, any referendum under section 128 of the
Constitution to bring into effect a republic should only be
assented to by the Governor-General under section 128 if passed
by a majority of all voters and a majority of voters in all
states. If this is accepted, it does provide a higher point of
principle and consensus for the purpose of creating such a
fundamental change to a republic.
It has been claimed by those
proposing a republic that it will unify us as Australians, that
we can more proudly be Australians with an Australian head of
state- cut out the Queen and we can hold our head high among
other nations at the Sydney 2000 Olympics as independently
Australian. I have spent five years travelling the world
promoting Western Australia, and I have never had the question
put to me that I am not Australian because we have the Queen as
our head of state.
If the majority of Western
Australians decide at such a referendum that they do not want a
republic, are they then any less Australian? If they decide, for
whatever reason, that they do not trust a move to change their
head of state, their Governor, do they renounce their Australian
heritage or are they simply to be treated as misguided
Australians who hopefully will come to their senses in time to
make the supposed essential change? On page 4 in the executive
summary of the Western Australian Constitutional Committee's
report, there is a very important message:
The Committee has
been impressed by the extent to which the many Western
Australians who made oral and written submissions to it are
conscious of their identity as both Australians and Western
Australians. We would have a defective republic if, in the view
of the majority of voters in any state, the Australian head of
state was not really their head of state. Respect for the
position comes from a general acceptance that the position
carries the authority it deserves.
I would hate to see a
situation where an Australian head of state would be welcome only
by a minority of people in any state of Australia. A majority of
voters in New South Wales cannot pave that welcome for the head
of state in Western Australia if the majority of people in
Western Australia do not equally think, feel and vote for it- and
they will not grow into that view over time if they first reject
that view at a national referendum.
If you believe this to be
wrong, simply look at the issue of daylight saving in Western
Australia which has had a long history of rejection at referenda.
While a majority of eastern states enjoy daylight saving, Western
Australia is different. While most people have an opinion about
daylight saving, everyone accepts that it is not practical in
that state. This is not an argument for separatism or special
pleading. For those who wish to have a republic, it is not an
argument for letting one state step on the hose or drag down the
rest of the country; it is a democratic argument for ensuring
that we are all part of the same country. It is also an inclusive
and truly federalist argument.
A republic is not something
that can be driven in over the top of people. I do not accuse
those in the Australian Republican Movement of doing so; they do
genuinely believe that the public will come with them. What I am
suggesting is that should a clear model for a republic be
developed by consensus from this Convention then the terms of a
referendum for change should be drafted and put to the
appropriate constitutional amendment processes; that is, at the
Commonwealth level, a republic should be voted on in a section
128 referendum.
However, on issues that
affect or concern state constitutions or governors, then state
processes- whether state referenda or legislation- must be
utilised. Therefore, a referendum under section 128 could be held
in tandem with similar state referenda as they are required by
state constitutions or legislation proclaimed to coincide with
the outcome of the referenda. Should a majority of voters in all
states decide to vote in the model for a republic, then this will
come into effect for all Australians at the same time.
There is and should continue
to be a clear distinction based on the federal nature of
Australia's constitutional arrangements between the amendment of
the Commonwealth Constitution and of state constitutions. Simply
put, section 128 of the Commonwealth Constitution must not be
used to effect changes to state constitutions. Apart from legal
arguments about the limitations on the scope of section 128, the
only appropriate way to effect changes to state constitutions is
via the mechanisms which the states themselves have adopted.
There are no justifications
either in principle or practice for section 128 to deal with, for
example, the position and powers of state governors. Any attempt
to do so will involve far-reaching consequences. Examples
include: an unwelcome and unnecessary, not to say distinctly
non-federal, development in the processes of constitutional
change and amendment in Australia; the amendment of state
constitutional structures, institutions and powers by a national
referendum which is opposed by a majority of voters in the state.
That is, unacceptable changes might, for example, be imposed on
one or two states by other Australians.
If a section 128 referendum
can penetrate so far into state constitutional arrangements to be
able to remove state governors, then there appears to be no limit
to what future section 128 referendums may do. To put it
succinctly, the people in New South Wales, Victoria, South
Australia and Tasmania could amend the Western Australian
constitution or even the Queensland constitution against the
democratic will of the people in Western Australia or Queensland.
That is taking centralism too far.
The argument that those who
favour a centralist or non-federalist approach by advocating use
of section 128 to impose a republic at both the Commonwealth and
state levels and disregard a true Australian consensus are not
only standing on dubious constitutional grounds but equally
importantly are throwing away the very basis of how our
Constitution was created and continues to be sustained. It will
rankle state parliaments and it will rankle voters in states-
most definitely in Western Australia. Similarly, any attempt to
use section 15(3) of the Australia Act to impose a republic on
the Australian public would be undemocratic and unwise.
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN- I
call the Hon. Denver Beanland, the Attorney-General of
Queensland.
Mr BEANLAND- Thank you very
much Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. Power and all of its
aspects is the fundamental question on each issue which we are
debating here at this conference. So far at this Convention, we
have heard many conflicting ideas being expressed about whether
or not we should have a president and, if so, what are to be the
powers of the president.
I point out that our
Constitution was founded on the principle that the people of the
respective states, humbly relying on the blessing of almighty
God, agreed to unite into one indissoluble federal Commonwealth
under the Crown. If the Crown is to be replaced by a president,
Australia must still remain one indissoluble federal
Commonwealth. So far we have not heard any significant
consideration of how this federal essence of Australia is to be
maintained in the appointment of the proposed president.
Indeed, looking at the models
put forward for the popular election of the president, with
so-called `open nominations', it is nothing more than an elitist
proposal with a select group of people and organisations becoming
a presidential nominating committee. It is this body that would
control the presidential nomination in a similar way to the
elitist McGarvie model, which is even more under the control of
an unrepresentative group. If we have open nominations for
candidates for a popular election of the president they, to be
successful, would either belong to a political party or be very
wealthy independent candidates. All this is highly likely to lead
to the election of a non-politician, as many claim is essential
if a president is to be acceptable to the Australian people.
If a new president is to be
accepted by the Australian people, then it is my submission that
he or she will only be acceptable if the method of their
appointment reflects the essential nature of Australia as an
indissoluble federal Commonwealth. So far we have heard arguments
for broad propositions which all suffer from the fatal flaw that,
if adopted, they would enable the golden triangle of Sydney,
Melbourne and Canberra to determine who is to be Australia's
president and thereby ignore the interests and concerns of people
from other areas of Australia. These models centralise power, to
the detriment of all Australians. Unless all Australian citizens,
whether they live in the Torres Strait, the Kimberley, at
Esperance or at Zeehan, feel they have a real and proper role in
the selection of their head of state, then the fundamental nature
of an indissoluble federal Commonwealth will be put under strain.
I note that it has been
claimed that a president can have the same power as the
Governor-General- no more, no less. This view, with respect, is
fallacious. The powers of the Governor-General, both as
legislated and arising from convention, are the product of
hundreds of years of development, from absolute monarchy to
constitutional monarchy. Monarchy and all that means, however,
remains an essential element of all such powers. It is
contradictory to suggest that the president of a republic, where
the essential concept is that power springs from the people and
not from the monarch, can be the same as that of a
governor-general whose power springs from that of a
constitutional monarch. A president will have a mandate to
represent all Australians, no matter by what process they are
appointed.
The president will thus have
a responsibility to all Australians in our great Federation, not
merely to those elites who might be involved in the process of
appointment. Suggestions for appointment of a president, even by
a two-thirds majority of both houses of the Commonwealth
parliament jointly sitting, will mean that, given the strength of
the Australian political party system, only a president favoured
by those persons who control the political parties will ever have
a hope of being elected. Are the people of Australia going to
accept a president so representative of the power elites?
A direct plebiscite of the
Australian people will, regardless of presidential powers, give
to the president a mandate to go forth and promote his or her
causes which may very well be in conflict with the government of
the day. The words of a president- I repeat, `words of a
president'- no matter how appointed, are going to be powerful
weapons in the political process of Australia. This will be so no
matter in what form the powers are given to a president.
I have heard an attempt to
argue that a Queenslander or a person from an outlying state
could become a president if they are good enough. However, not
only will they have to be good enough; they will still have to
get the numbers from the golden triangle. We all know that the
only Queenslander to become Governor-General got there because it
was convenient for the power elite to get him off the political
stage. He fulfilled the role with distinction, but it is unlikely
that the circumstances which led to his appointment would be
repeated in relation to the election of a president. This is a
bone the elite will never surrender.
Again, suggestions for the
establishment of a council of elders or wise persons to control
appointment and dismissal of a president are also fatally flawed.
Once more, the self-perpetrating power elites would be in
control. Where is the federal balance in all this? I have heard
proposals at this Convention for various forms of filters in
order to ensure that only proper and suitable people are
considered for the role of president. How arrogant! How elitist!
How full of their own self-importance are those who advance these
proposals! And we have a number of these proposals. They
obviously do not trust the Australian people if we are to abandon
a constitutional monarchy. Advocates of a popular election point
to Ireland as an example of success of this system and use it to
justify their support for such a process in Australia. This is
nonsensical as when I last looked at the counties of Ireland they
had not formed a federation. Further, it is a pocket handkerchief
sized country compared with this vast land with an appointed, not
an elected upper house- a very important point to keep in mind.
In Australia's case, it is
the federal nature of our system of government that both
recognises our origins and strengthens our institutions of
government and saves us from the pressures and tensions that so
bedevil other countries. It is vital that this be preserved,
irrespective of whether or not Australia moves to a republic.
Other federations have
addressed this issue of creating a mechanism for the appointment
of their head of state which gives recognition to all factors,
particularly that of mainstreaming or maintaining the federal
balance. In the United States of America the Federal Electoral
College, in recognising different weightings depending on
differing populations of states, gives a capacity for the smaller
political units of the federation to have an influence on the
appointment of the President. On the other hand, I am much
attracted by the principles inherent in the mechanism adopted by
the German federation. There the President is chosen from an
electoral college, chosen by the parliaments of the German states
as well as by the parliament of the federation. Thus, the views
of all citizens, no matter where they might live, are able to be
represented through the mechanism which has been devised.
We should give real attention
at this Convention to devising a system for the election of a
president which recognises the essential federal nature of
Australia. Unless we do so, then this republic, should it come to
pass, being so promoted by republicans, could be just the first
republic and be followed over the coming decades by the second
republic, the third republic, the fourth republic and so on.
Under this model, there would be no need for an elitist
nominating committee. All Australians, regardless of their status
in life, would be able to nominate. An election would be by a
simple majority, as are all other elections for public office in
this country.
We do a disservice to the
people whom we represent here if we do not acknowledge that a
republic is a fundamental change that will flow from our
abandonment of a constitutional monarchy. If that is so, then any
president must be chosen in a way that not only satisfies a
majority within Australia but also is acceptable by the minority
as being properly representative of the essence of Australia.
Our federal system, which is
the basis upon which Australia was formed as a nation, must
therefore be fundamentally reflected in the discussions that take
place at this Convention and any proposition that might
ultimately be put to the Australian people. Our strength as a
nation comes from not only the way in which power is divided
between our respective levels of government but also the way in
which it is dispersed across this vast nation. (Extension of
time granted)
I fear, however, that we have
already seen at this Convention and from the proponents of the
introduction of a republic an attempt to attack the fundamental
federal nature of Australia. If this is not so, then I look
forward to propositions being advanced by those who argue the
republican cause which will ensure that Australia will indeed
remain one indissoluble federal Commonwealth.
Ladies and gentlemen, we must
keep in mind that any changes at all will have a major effect
upon the states and upon the people living in the states and the
far flung parts of those states. Even though these points have
not been considered to date, I implore you to give very careful
consideration of these matters in the coming days.
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN- I am
giving the call to Chris Gallus, but this slight pause gives me
the opportunity to appeal once more to people not to have mobile
phones turned on. It is a gross distraction and a gross
discourtesy to the members of the Convention. If you have a
mobile phone on your person, make sure it is turned off.
Brigadier GARLAND-
Throw them out, Mr Deputy Chairman.
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN- I am
not quite sure how far my power extends to the galleries. It is
easier to throw out a member of the Convention. Chris Gallus, the
member for Hindmarsh.
Mrs GALLUS- I would like the
delegates here today to remember that they are the people's
convention. Half of you today were elected by the people. It is
important that you remember that because I get the very strong
impression that there are agendas in this room that the people
who voted for you would say, `That is not what we voted for.'
In particular, I say to the
Australian Republican Movement, when people ticked the ballot
boxes for the ARM they never dreamt they were ticking the boxes
of a party that was going to oppose a popular election. If they
had known that, if you had honestly gone to the people and said,
`The Australian Republican Movement opposes popular election,'
you would not have got the votes that you got and your numbers
today would not be in that block, they would be considerably
smaller. I want you to think in your consciences about the people
who voted for you and what they expected from you.
To the delegates today and
those in the public gallery, I think all of us are very much
aware that the Australian public is disenchanted with our
political system. We have evidence of a fragmenting society. Not
only do we have a large and growing class of permanently
unemployed and, therefore, a growing inequality in this society
but we have a disenchantment with the structures of our society
and the whole political process. If we in this election turn our
backs on the people of Australia and say to them, `The
politicians will choose your president,' they in turn will turn
their backs on us and the political process in Australia. Think
of this when you vote.
Think about if you went today
to the people and asked them who Sir William Deane was how many
would be able to tell you. Everybody in this room would, but I
can tell you, as somebody who deals every single day with people,
that the great majority of people who come to my office do not
know who Sir William Deane is. The problem, if you do not have a
popularly elected head of state, will be that the people will not
know who their head of state is because they will have had no
involvement in the process.
We have to draw the
Australian society together and one way is to have an elected
head of state chosen not by a select group, chosen not by
politicians but chosen by the people who should choose the
leaders in our society- that is, the people. Ask yourselves: are
we really a democracy or are we not?
I have found here today that,
despite having a somewhat more old-fashioned point of view, you
might call it, the monarchists are more likely to consider this
proposition than is the republican movement. I ask the members of
the republican movement to look to what they stand for and what
they were voted in for and ask themselves if the people who voted
for them did indeed vote against the notion of an elected
president because I think they will have to say honestly that
they did not.
There are problems with an
elected president, but the model that was produced here this
morning does get over those problems. Denver Beanland, who spoke
before me, said that one of the problems with an elected
president is that the process becomes owned by the political
parties or by someone of great wealth. That can be avoided. You
simply say that we do not allow any paid advertising and there is
publicly funded media both print and electronic.
A further objection to a
popularly elected president is that people may not want to put
themselves before the public and talk to the public through the
media. Then do not make them. There is no reason why someone
standing for president or head of state- I am sorry we have
removed the word `president' from the model we were looking at-
has to speak for themself. A nominating person can speak for
them. For instance, if the Manufacturing Council was nominating
to the appointments council someone for head of state and that
person did not want to talk for themself then somebody from that
council could appear and talk for them and explain why this
person has these qualities.
Do not dismiss this out of
hand simply because you want another model. Think of its
advantages. Think that we can find a way of giving the people
what they want and still build in all those safeguards that we
are so scared of losing.
The model that I presented
here today has the ultimate safeguard: that if the head of state
goes beyond the powers that the Governor-General presently has or
that are given in the Constitution, the House of Representatives,
by an absolute vote- which is simply a majority of the members of
the House of Representatives- can vote for dismissal and, on that
advice, the appointing counsel dismisses the head of state.
Some will say that gives too
much power to the Prime Minister and to the government. But, if
they make this decision and it is not a decision that is approved
by the people, next time they will have to go to a popular
election where the people will tell the Prime Minister and the
government what they think of them. So the safeguard is built in.
This is the safest model you can have to stop a head of state
exceeding the powers that he or she should have. Please think of
that and do not dismiss it out of hand, because it provides what
the people of Australia have asked us to provide- an elected head
of state.
When we vote, as we will, on
the resolutions, my first request to you is to vote this
resolution past the first hurdle. Many of you are coming from a
different position and will not want to support it in the final
analysis, but it is a good model and it needs an opportunity to
be debated. If you refuse it this opportunity by voting it out of
this Convention at the very first step, then I put to you that
you are betraying the faith of the people of Australia who voted
for you to come here to the people's Convention to represent them
and what they wanted.
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Last updated: 21 October 2000
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