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  Working for a better Australia through constitutional reform

The Constitutional Convention of February 1998

A missed opportunity for much-needed reform.

 Introduction  Delegates  Proceedings  Summaries

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Thursday, 12 February 1998
Page 1

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Full Delegates List

PROXIES TABLED BY THE CHAIRMAN

 

PRINCIPAL
 

PROXY
 

Mr Howard
 

Senator Minchin
 

Mr Carr
 

Mr Iemma
 

Mr Borbidge
 

Mr FitzGerald
 

Mr Olsen
 

Mr Griffin (6th and 11th February)
 

Mr Rundle
 

Mr Hodgman
 

Mrs Carnell
 

Ms Webb
 

Mr Stone
 

Mr Burke
 

Mr Bacon
 

Ms Jackson (4th, 5th and 6th February)
 

Mr Collins
 

Mr Hannaford (3rd-6th and 9th-10th February)
 

Senator Alan Ferguson
 

Mr Abbott (2nd-6th February)
 

Mr Kennett
 

Dr Dean (All, except 11th February)
 

Mr Beattie
 

Mr Foley (4-6 February)
   

Mr Milliner (9-10 February)
 

Mr Court
 

Mr Barnett
 

Sir David Smith
 

Professor Flint (5th February)
 

Mr Fox
 

Mr McGuire (5th-6th February)
 

Mr Beazley
 

Mr McLeay (from 3pm 5th February,
   

6th, 9th and 11th February)
   

Mr McMullan (10th February, 9.00 am to 2.00 pm)
   

Mr Martin (10th February, 4.30 pm to 7.30 pm)
 

Ms George
 

Ms Doran
 

Mr Kilgariff
 

Mr McCallum (6th February from 4 pm)
 

Sir James Killen
 

Mr Paul (6th February from 3.30 pm)
 

Ms Imlach
 

Mr Nockles (6th February, afternoon)
 

Senator Faulkner
 

Mr Melham (9th February)
 

Reverend Costello
 

Mr Castan (6th February)
 

Mr O'Farrell
 

Professor Flint
 

Ms Rodgers
 

Mr Mackerras
 

Mr Withers
 

Mr Paul (9th February)
 

Mr Green
 

Ms Jackson (9th February)
 

Senator Bolkus
 

Mr McClelland (9th-10th February)
 

Mr McGauchie
 

Dr Craik (9th February)
 

Mr Anderson
 

Mr Abbott (as necessary)
 

Mr Costello
 

Senator Campbell (9th February, from 3 pm)
   

Mr Pyne (10th February, 9.00 am to 3 pm)
 

Senator Hill
 

Senator Payne (10th February)
 

Dame Kramer
 

Professor Flint (11th February)
   
 

Proxies continued-
 
   
 

PRINCIPAL
 

PROXY
 

Mr Bonner
 

Mr Longstaff (11th February)
   

Professor Flint (12th-13th February)
 

Reverend Hepworth
 

Mr Pearson (11th February)
 

Mr Beanland
 

Mr Carroll (13th February)
 

Ms Ferguson
 

Dr Howard (12th February, morning)
 

Mr James
 

Mr Freeman (11th February, from 6 pm)
 

Mr Chipp
 

Mr Fitzgerald (11th February, from 6 pm)
 

Mr Castle
 

Professor Flint (11th February)
 

Mr Andrew
 

Mr Slipper (10th February, 2.00 pm to 4.00 pm)

Convention met at 9.00 a.m.

CHAIRMAN- The administration of proxies over the last few days has allowed a large number of delegates to go and come as they wish. I point out that under the rules of debate, while heads of government and leaders of oppositions demonstrably are given considerable flexibility, other delegates are only to be given a proxy on compassionate grounds.

Accordingly, due to the significance of the votes that are to take place over the next two days, I suggest that all delegates, other than heads of government and leaders of oppositions who wish to have a proxy, need to re-tender that proxy. Strictly, they need to be on the basis of the compassionate grounds that were accepted by the Convention at the beginning of proceedings. If we do that, then nobody will be in a position of being able to question the outcome of votes on the basis that the person who voted is a proxy who may or may not be entitled to attend.

I also want to go through a few other matters. I want to go through the Notice Paper and identify how we intend to proceed today. The debate on the proposed republican models will be the basis of our proceedings this morning. We have four models. I propose to allow the mover of each of the models 10 minutes to present his particular model. All subsequent speakers, including the seconder, will be allowed five minutes to speak. We will then go into the voting at 12 noon.

The voting procedures will be amplified prior to our voting commencing, but I believe they will allow a fair indication of each person's vote, the way in which they have cast their vote, and for it to be seen in the public in a way which ensures that nobody can have any questions about the outcome. After the luncheon adjournment from 1 until 2, we will proceed to the debate and vote on the final preferred model.

The difference between amendments as of this morning and this afternoon is that, if there are any amendments to any proposed model this morning, they have to be supported by at least 10 of the persons who support that model. This afternoon it is any 10 delegates, but this morning if there is to be any amendment to a model it must be supported by the person who proposes that particular model and those 10 or more delegates who are the supporters of it.

As soon as possible, the secretariat is going to circulate a consolidated package that consists of the following: the Notice Paper, which has already been circulated; the four republican models receiving the endorsement of 10 or more delegates, as circulated yesterday; the procedural resolution about today's and tomorrow's processes; and the paper on voting procedures which was circulated last night.

Shortly before voting starts at 12 noon, I intend that we ring the bells for three minutes and we will cease proceedings while that happens. I propose that, as there is to be voting by paper, to save having to appoint individual scrutineers, the voting be done on the Bar table. That means that everybody will see the votes. The voting will be conducted by the Convention secretariat and the piles will be there for everybody to see. It seems to me to be the most open way by which the process can be conducted.

Shortly before voting starts, delegates will receive envelopes containing ballot papers for the exhaustive ballot and any yes or no ballots that might be necessary. Delegates are to ensure that they are in their correct seats when the envelopes are distributed and during the voting. As I have mentioned, proxies are going to be strictly in accordance with the rules at the commencement of voting at noon today. I do not believe that we can allow there to be any question that any person is voting unless they are fully entitled to vote within the Convention process.

Let me also repeat, for those who were concerned about the outcomes of some of the processes yesterday, that delegates should remember that there was a very strong endorsement given by the Convention to a resolution moved by the Reverend Tim Costello about ongoing constitutional reform. It would be intended that that particular resolution, plus the voting and the very strong support given by the Convention to it, will be included in the Convention communique.

 

Sir DAVID SMITH- I seek leave to make a personal explanation. Last night, during the debate on the flag and the coat of arms, Gareth Evans and I exchanged epithets about the quality of our respective reports relating to this matter. After the debate had concluded, we discovered that this unpleasantness had been brought about quite inadvertently and through the fault of neither of us. The document which had been passed to the Resolutions Group as a copy of my report on behalf of Working Group K was, in fact, some other document. As a result, the report from the Resolutions Group had been based on a wrong document. In these circumstances, Gareth Evans and I exchanged apologies and shook hands. As Hansard quite properly will have recorded our original altercation on the floor of the chamber, it should also record what took place later behind the Speaker's chair.

 

Brigadier GARLAND- I wish to make a point of clarification. Yesterday, during the debate on the preamble, I posed the question to the Attorney-General that the leading paragraphs in clauses 1 through 8 would remain and somewhere in clause 9, which would become, say, 1(a), we would get a preamble which covered all the new bits and pieces. I asked whether that was right. I was under the impression that the Attorney-General answered that question, but when I read the Hansard this morning there is no record of any answer being given by the Attorney-General or by his colleague Gareth Evans. For the record, I believe it is necessary that an answer to that question be recorded. I ask you to have the Attorney-General answer that question. It was posed on page 539 in the Hansard.

 

CHAIRMAN- I might ask the Hansard people to check whether it has been omitted. I think that would be the best way to proceed. If necessary, it not being in the Hansard, then I will call on the Attorney at a later stage to respond before voting this afternoon. At the end of proceedings this morning, if there has not been an answer, I will ensure that the Attorney finds an appropriate opportunity to give you the answer. Are there any other questions or matters delegates wish to raise before we proceed to the debate on the proposed republican models? If there are no other matters, then I call on the mover of the first model, Dr Gallop.

 

MODEL A

Dr GALLOP- I move:

 

MODEL A

Direct Election Model

ELIGIBILITY:

Every Australian citizen qualified to be a member of the Commonwealth Parliament and who has forsworn any allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power shall be eligible for election and to hold office as the Australian Head of State, provided that he or she is not a member of the Commonwealth Parliament or a State or Territory Parliament at the time of nomination nor is a member of a political party during the term of office of Head of State.

NOMINATION:

Nominations for the office of Australian Head of State may be made by:

(a) Any Australian citizen qualified to be a member of the Commonwealth Parliament;

(b) The Senate or House of Representatives;

(c) Either House of a State or Territory Parliament;

(d) Any Local Government.

SHORTLISTING:

A joint sitting of the Senate and House of Representatives shall by at least a two-thirds (2/3) majority choose no fewer than three (3) candidates from eligible nominees for an election of the Head of State by the people of Australia.

ELECTION:

The election of the Head of State shall be by the people of Australia voting directly by secret ballot with preferential voting by means of a single transferable vote. Parliament shall make laws to regulate campaign expenditure by and for candidates contesting an election for Head of State and to provide advertising and campaign support through a single body authorised and funded by the Parliament.

TENURE:

The Head of State shall hold office for two (2) terms of the House of Representatives and shall be ineligible for re-election at the next Head of State election.

DISMISSAL:

The Head of State may be dismissed by an absolute majority of the House of Representatives on the grounds of stated misbehaviour or incapacity or behaviour inconsistent with the terms of his or her appointment.

CASUAL VACANCY:

A casual vacancy in the office of Head of State shall be filled by the appointment of a caretaker by an absolute majority of the House of Representatives who shall hold office until the election of a new Head of State at the next House of Representatives election.

NON-RESERVE POWERS:

The existing practice that non-reserve powers should be exercised only in accordance with the advice of the Government shall be stated in the Constitution.

RESERVE POWERS:

Existing reserve powers shall be partially-codified as generally provided in the Republic Advisory Committee's 1993 report (see attached) where the Head of State retains appropriate discretion. However, the Head of State shall not dissolve the House of Representatives by reason of the rejection or failure to pass a money bill unless and until the procedures under section 5A of such report have been followed or unless an absolute majority of the House of Representatives has request such dissolution.

 

 

 

 

REPUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE 1993:

1A Executive Power of the Commonwealth

(1)The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Head of State and is exercisable either directly or through Ministers of State (including the Prime Minister) or persons acting with their authority.

(2)The executive power of the Commonwealth extends to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution, and the laws of the Commonwealth.

(3)The Head of State shall exercise his or her powers and functions in accordance with the advice tendered to him or her by the Federal Executive Council, the Prime Minister or other such Ministers of State as are authorised to do so by the Prime Minister.

(4)Subsection (3) does not apply in relation to the exercise of the powers or functions of the Head of State under sections 2A, 3A(4), 4A, 5A and 6A.

2A Appointment of the Prime Minister

(1)The Head of State shall appoint a person, to be known as the Prime Minister, to be the Head of the Government of the Commonwealth.

(2)Subject to subsection 3A(4), whenever it is necessary for the Head of State to appoint a Prime Minister, the Head of State shall appoint that person who commands the support of the House of Representatives expressed through a resolution of the House, and in the absence of such a resolution, the person who, in his or her judgment, is the most likely to command the support of that House.

(3)The Prime Minister shall not hold office for a longer period than 90 days unless he or she is or becomes a member of the House of Representatives.

(4) The Prime Minister shall be a member of the Federal Executive Council and shall be one of the Ministers of State for the Commonwealth.

(5) The Prime Minister shall hold office, subject to this Constitution, until he or she dies or resigns, or the Head of State terminates his or her appointment.

(6) The exercise of power of the Head of State under subsection (2) shall not be examined in any court.

3A Other Ministers

(1) Ministers of State shall be appointed by the Head of State acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.

(2) One of the Ministers of State may be denominated Deputy Prime Minister.

(3) Subject to this section, the Head of State shall only remove a Minister from office in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.

(4) Upon the death of the Prime Minister, The Head of State shall appoint the Deputy Prime Minister or, if there is no Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister most senior in rank, to be the Prime Minister.

(5) In this section, "Minister" does not include the Prime Minister.

4A Dismissal of the Prime Minister- no confidence resolutions

(1) If the House of Representatives, by an absolute majority of its members, passes a resolution of confidence in a named person as Prime Minister (other than the person already holding office as Prime Minister), and the Prime Minister does not forthwith resign from office, the Head of State shall remove him or her from office.

(2) If the House of Representatives passes, other than by an absolute majority of its members, a resolution of confidence in a named person as Prime Minister (other than the person already holding office as Prime Minister), and the Prime Minister does not within three days resign from office or secure a reversal of that resolution, the Head of State shall remove him or her from office.

(3) If the House of Representatives passes a resolution of no confidence in the Prime Minister or the Government by an absolute majority of its members and does not name another person in whom it does have confidence, and the Prime Minister does not, within three days of the passing of that resolution, either resign from office, secure a reversal of that resolution or advise the Head of State to dissolve the Parliament, the Head of State shall remove him or her from the office of Prime Minister.

(4) If the House of Representatives passes a resolution of no-confidence in the Prime Minister or the Government other than by an absolute majority of its members and does not name another person in whom it does have confidence, and the Prime Minister does not, within seven days of the passing of that resolution, either resign from office, secure a reversal of that resolution or advise the Head of State to dissolve the Parliament, the Head of State shall remove him or her from the office of Prime Minister.

5A Dismissal of the Prime Minister- constitutional contravention

(1) If the Head of State believes that the Government of the Commonwealth is contravening a fundamental provision of this Constitution or is not complying with an order of a court, the Head of State may request the Prime Minister to demonstrate that no contravention is occurring or

that the Government is complying with the order.

(2) If, after giving the Prime Minister that opportunity, the Head of State still believes that such a contravention or non-compliance is occurring, the Head of State may apply to the High Court for relief.

(3) If, on application by the Head of State, the High Court is satisfied that the Government of the Commonwealth is contravening a provision of this Constitution or not complying with the order of a court, the High Court may grant such relief as it sees fit including a declaration to that effect. The High Court shall not decline to hear such application on the ground that it raises non-justiciable issues.

(4) If on an application by the Head of State, the High Court declares that the Government of the Commonwealth is contravening this Constitution or not complying with the order of a court and the Prime Minister fails to take all reasonable steps to end the contravention or to ensure compliance with the order, the Head of State may dissolve the House of Representatives.

(5) If the Head of State dissolves the House of Representatives under this section, he or she may also terminate the Prime Minister's commission and appoint as Prime Minister such other person who the Head of State believes will take all reasonable steps to end the contravention and who will maintain the administration of the Commonwealth pending the outcome of the general election following the dissolution referred to in subsection (4) above.

(6) The exercise of the powers of the Head of State under this section shall not be examined by any court.

6A Refusal of dissolution

The Head of State shall not dissolve the House of Representatives-

(a) on the advice of a Prime Minister in whom, or in whose Government, the House of Representatives has passed a resolution of no-confidence, if the House has, by an absolute majority of its members, also expressed confidence in another named person as Prime Minister;

(b) on the advice of a Prime Minister in whom, or in whose Government, the House of Representatives has passed a resolution of no-confidence, if the House has, other than by an absolute majority of its members, also expressed confidence in another named person as Prime Minister, unless the House has reversed the resolution;

(c) while a motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister or the government is pending; or

(d) before the House of Representatives has met after a general election and considered whether it has confidence in the Prime Minister or the Government, unless the House of Representatives has met and is unable to elect a Speaker.

For the purpose of paragraph (c), a "motion of no-confidence" is one which expresses confidence in another named person as Prime Minister and is to come before the House of Representatives within eight days.

 

I would like to take this opportunity to say a couple of things about the direct presidential election group model. The first is to indicate that that model emerged from a good deal of discussion amongst people from all parts of the political spectrum with different views upon how you would achieve a republic. In the end, we believe that the focus should be placed on a central element of a republic, and that, of course, is the direct election of the people.

We entered into the spirit of this Convention by taking on board many of the arguments that were raised within this chamber and within the working groups about the problems that might result from having a direct election of a president or head of state in a future republic, and we have tried to overcome the criticism that there would be the creation of two centres of power.

In our model, as you will see, we make it clear that our system is still a system of responsible government, of parliamentary government, and we do that through a couple of devices: the device of codification, inasmuch as this Convention has required us to take that idea; and the device in terms of the dismissal process.

We have also tried to address the criticism that if you have a direct election, of course money will take over the process. We make it absolutely clear that any direct election process should be regulated and, in those regulations, provision should be made to ensure that money will not play a role in the process, that there will be regulation of the election and that public funds will enable candidates to be on an equal playing field.

We looked at the question of supply between the House of Representatives and the Senate. This Convention, of course, argued very clearly that there was only a limited degree to which that issue could be addressed. We took on board the recommendations of the Republican Advisory Committee, as outlined in their report, which make it absolutely clear that the only occasion on which a government would be put at risk would be where there is a clear contravention of the Constitution and a clear, proven illegality involved.

In relation to the criticism of our model that political judgment has it that it is not achievable because of the range of forces in our community, I will leave that to delegates to judge.

Let me conclude my comments today by going to the heart of the issue- by looking very clearly at the case for direct election. You all know what is in our model and the issues concerned. I have canvassed some of them already. My role today, I think, is to make clear to you why we believe that direct election is so important. We need to remind ourselves that in moving to a republic we are creating a new political institution, that is, an Australian head of state. It will need to be an important institution. It will need to be a respected institution. This does not mean that it will have to possess great decision making political power.

Surely delegates would acknowledge that there are many institutions in our society of great importance which do not possess direct decision making powers in relation to society as a whole. They have authority, they are respected and they are important. At one time, of course, the British monarchy played such a role in our community, and it would seem that it still plays that role in the United Kingdom today. It is a powerful force for unity in that country, but no longer in our own nation because of the social, economic and political changes that have occurred over the last three decades. The fact that it is no longer the case in Australia today is, of course, the very reason we are meeting in this Convention.

I turn now, with those thoughts in mind, to the aspirations of our people. What the opinion polls tell us is what I would hope we would expect: the people want to be directly involved in the republic beyond the vote to establish that republic. They want a vote for who is to be their head of state. This is an aspiration, it is a desire; indeed, I would say that it is a longing of the people to be involved in the election of the head of state. It is a reflection of the deeply held view in our community that the people are the ultimate power in this land- a land which proclaims democratic traditions and credentials to be at the core of its system. It is also a reflection of the view that they want a choice as to who will be the head of state. They want a direct say in this rather than have some other institution make the final decision.

I now return to where I started: the creation of a new Australian institution. If our republic is to work properly by capturing not just the interests and intellect of people but also their hearts and their souls, it will need some connecting threads. It will need a head of state who symbolises and represents the nation and with whom the people can feel a connection. That is where direct election comes in. Take that out of the equation and we risk creating a purely utilitarian republic, a purely soulless republic. By placing a small portion of the monarchical power in each of us, we ensure a degree of personal ownership of the new system we are creating.

I can hear already the objections to this point of view from those well versed in the daily skulduggery and backstabbing that occurs in the house on the hill behind us. I take those points into account, but reaffirm that we must establish our new system in a way that connects it to the people, to their sentiments, to their desires, to their beliefs and to their aspirations. We need to do that. Let me conclude by saying: take the people out of the system and you take the system out of the people. That is not a republic.

 

CHAIRMAN- I call on Mr Peter Beattie as the seconder of the motion to speak to it. It is my intention to allow the mover and seconder to speak. I then intend to have each of the models presented before we start to debate them.

 

Mr BEATTIE- I second the motion. I came to this Convention as a strong supporter of the direct election of the president, and I remain a strong supporter of the direct election of the president. This is all about giving the Australian republic heart. It is about empowering Australians in the political process.

I have been associated with a loose group of direct election republicans. It has been an honour and a privilege, because they are committed Australians who came here to represent the will and the wishes of the Australian people. It has been a difficult road, but the wishes and the will of the Australian people are reflected in this model. For those handful of you who have not made up your minds, I urge you in the dying parts of this debate to think about this model, because it reflects the will of the Australian people. That has been demonstrated in poll after poll. I am not going to go through that- but it reflects what Australians want.

To those who have come out and said, `Well, we don't know that Australians fully understand the pitfalls of a direct election,' I say that I do not accept that argument. I have faith in the Australian people. I have faith in their intelligence; I have faith in their commitment; and I have faith in the fact that they want to have a direct say.

We are living in a new era. It is an era of new politics. The era of the old politics is gone. When you talk about how referendums were lost in the past because they needed the support of the federal government or this government or that political party, let me tell you, delegates: that is the politics of old politics. It has gone. These days people want power for themselves. You see, they are sick of political parties and politicians doing all the deals. They want new politics where they have a say. That is why, in my view, the referendum that has the most likely-

 

Senator Boswell interjecting-

 

Mr BEATTIE- You see, the old process produces politicians like you. That is why people want a change. Mr Chairman, if you will protect me from the interjections of the National Party, I might proceed. What we want is simply to give the Australian people a say. That is what we want, and that is what Australians want. They want new politics. That is why, when it comes to a referendum, they will vote for a model that empowers them- that gives them a say. I think those who do not understand that are misunderstanding the Australian people.

Certainly, any model has its difficulties, but the Australian way has always been to overcome those difficulties. We did it right back in our history- right back from the Anzacs. We had the courage and the guts to take problems head on. I believe we can overcome any difficulties with this model. Codification or partial codification is one of the ways to do it.

Let us look at what the model says: every Australian citizen qualified to be a member of parliament and who owes no allegiance to any other country is eligible to nominate, provided she is not a member of parliament or a member of a political party. So all Australians can nominate. The election will be by Australian people in a secret ballot with preferential voting, so we are empowering the people to determine who the president will be. The tenure will be for two terms of the House of Representatives with the president not being eligible for immediate re-election. The nomination process is clearly set out. The model covers partial codification of powers, and the president can be dismissed by an absolute majority of the House of Representatives. The bottom line, Mr Chairman, is the direct election of the president and the empowering of the Australian people.

I remind delegates of what I said last week. It is no good winning the argument at this Convention and losing the referendum. What we have to do is go out and win this referendum through a majority of people in a majority of states, and that includes states like mine. As you know, Queensland, Western Australian and South Australian leaders have been very strong on this issue because we have to win the referendum in those states, not just in Sydney and Melbourne. Therefore, it is not good enough just to win the argument at this Convention; it has to be won in the hearts of the Australian people.

I conclude by saying that this proposal for the direct election of the president is about restoring the faith of the Australian people in the political process in this country. It is about giving a heart to democracy in Australia.

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Last updated: 21 October 2000